


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S.E. ASIA • FAR EAST • PACIFIC



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Number 2

Communist Threat to Thailand

by R. Y. Lee

The Strategic Significance of Tibet

by Maj. Gen. J. R. Hartwell

The Partition of Bengal

by Sir Robert Reid

Korean Pottery

by M. Kerslake

British Trade with China

by O. M. Green

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EASTERN WORLD

LAST RESORTS IN INDO-CHINA

The appointment of General Lattre de Tassigny as High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in Indo-China, thus combining both political and military control, was preceded by a number of concessions made by the French. The Conference at Pau at which, somewhat belatedly, the three States of Indo-China, Viet Nam (which includes Tongking, Annam and Cochinchina), Cambodia and Laos were granted a large measure of autonomy has, according to Emperor Bao Dai, accomplished the independence of the region. However, it is doubtful whether these concessions, vital though they are to the relationship between France and Indo-China, will succeed at this eleventh hour in counteracting Viet Minh nationalist propaganda which, from all accounts, has been remarkably successful. Even the French recognition of an independent Vietnamese Army last month, may have come too late to be effective since it is doubtful now whether there is still sufficient time to recruit and train as well as equip enough forces to give it any weight. France's success in Viet Nam and the achievement of her aims depends to a large extent on the popular support she can command. This, however, she has alienated by her refusal, until now, to meet Indo-China's nationalistic aspirations. Today, even by making hasty concessions, France has to face a still hostile national element, and in addition has to carry the burden of Indo-China's large trading deficit about which little can be done as long as the war lasts. America, although promising aid early last year, has done little to improve matters, and the optimism aroused by General Lattre de Tassigny, cannot obscure the fact that the war in Indo-China has taken a different course. No longer are the Viet Minh fighting a hand-to-hand guerilla warfare, but instead, have now a properly trained and equipped army, with large resources available outside the border.

It is to be hoped that the visit of M. Pleven, the French Prime Minister, to the United States will not bring

about a change in the hitherto careful French policy towards China. For without enormous American military help—and the case of Korea makes even this doubtful—Indo-China cannot be defended against an unfriendly China and without the co-operation of Viet Nam's unenthusiastic masses. If a way can be found to win the Vietnamese over to a way of life which immediately gives them not only nationalist but also economic satisfaction, there may still be some hope. This, however, is unlikely.

THE KASHMIR DISPUTE

While the Commonwealth Ministers' Conference in London last month showed definite results in the economic sphere, it is most regrettable that the vital question of Kashmir remained unsettled. Nobody can blame the Commonwealth statesmen for not trying to contribute towards a satisfactory solution; their offer to provide a Commonwealth force to maintain peace and security in Kashmir during a plebiscite, and to pay for such a force, was a constructive and imaginative attempt at mediation. While Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan accepted this and other proposals put forward by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers to enable a fair and free plebiscite to be held in Kashmir, Mr. Nehru has turned them down without, so far, offering an alternative solution. Both India and Pakistan have solemnly declared themselves bound to adhere to the principle of letting the people of Kashmir decide their own fate, but the present deadlock appears to be India's refusal to withdraw "the bulk" of her troops as demanded by the United Nations, there lacking any interpretation as to what constitutes the "bulk." The question has now been referred back to the Security Council, but the failure to come to an agreement in London seems to prove that there is little hope for a successful mediation from any outside source. The fate of Kashmir will have to be settled between India and Pakistan, and all one can hope for is that it will be settled peacefully. Any further delay will not benefit either neighbour; neither of them can afford to devote the major proportion of their budget to military expenditure connected with Kashmir to the detriment of internal requirements. Nor will Pandit Nehru's

brilliant international "key position" and advice in international affairs gain in strength, if he is unable to find a peaceful solution at home. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan is already finding it difficult to restrain some of his fellow countrymen whose impatience is dangerously drifting into a martial mood.

THE CHINESE QUESTION

The last few weeks have seen a quick succession of military and political events which, although containing all the portents of a renewed world disaster, are hastening developments with such speed that the result—war or peace—will soon be apparent. The military part is being fought out in Korea, while the battle around the conference tables in Washington, London and at the United Nations is being fought with no less heat. The situation is based predominantly on the most striking change in equilibrium in world politics—the emergence of Red China as one of the great world powers, not only in name, and on some of the other powers, especially America, refusing to realise this. To call China officially an "aggressor" after deliberately ignoring her existence for so long is just as pointless as to expect her to respect the wishes of U.N., an organisation from which she has been barred. That the Chinese crossed southwards over the 38th parallel was just as regrettable as Gen. MacArthur's crossing it to the North and in Chinese eyes was just as aggressive. The Korean campaign, once the 38th parallel was crossed by U.N. troops, was not popular in Asia and seen as just another "white man's war against Asia." The proof of this is the strong Asian reluctance at U.N. to support any drastic actions against Peking, and Britain's experienced and balanced advice to prevent a final break with the new China. While it is desirable that Anglo-American policy should be harmonious and united, it is difficult to see why this should throw Britain into an unwanted war and why her temperate and careful policy should not be accepted as the guiding one.

Believing in the freedom of the press, this journal represents a forum where articles containing many different, and often controversial, opinions are being published. They do not necessarily express the views or policy of the paper.

WESTMINSTER AND THE EAST

by Harold Davies, M.P.

AS this is being written news has come through that Chou En-lai, Peking's Foreign Minister, has rejected the United Nations "cease-fire" formula to end the Korean war, and the immediate reaction that I have found amongst members who are still here in London* is that despite this we must not be too precipitate in our denunciations of China at U.N.

Members are now anxious to be back in the House, and a glance at the Question Paper shows how they have been influenced by meetings up and down the country. The American stock-piling is creating great difficulties for Britain and every household is now beginning to feel the shock of events in Asia. The restriction of zinc supplies sent the housewife on a minor crusade for pots and pans in the past week or so and now, with a burden of £5,000 million for arms we shall bear a weight of taxation relatively greater than that of the American citizen. As a leading back-bencher said this week, "all our efforts to strengthen gold and dollar reserves will come to naught if raw materials are scarce through uncontrolled stock-piling." He saw in this crisis a reverse of that of 1931. In that period the raw material producers were at the bottom of the slump. Today these producers are in a key position and can demand any prices they want.

The Lobbies of the House appear grim and empty during the Recess, but there are always some Ministers and back-benchers to be found dining here. Most of them discussed the Coalition rumours that had been fostered in the press. I found in leading Labour circles no enthusiasm for such a project, and the appointment of Aneurin Bevan as Minister of Labour seems to show clearly that the Government is prepared to deal with the Asian crisis and the arms burden in its own way. The Prime Minister was clear enough in contradicting these rumours when I heard him speak to an enthusiastic audience at a dance given by the London Labour Party and the Fabian Society. He said that any rumours they might have heard of coalition were incorrect, and he added that neither had the party talked of another election. The Prime Minister did not know when a general election would take place. So, on the eve of our return to Parliament we find both Attlee and Bevan opposed to a coalition. Neither is there all that enthusiasm on the Right of the Tory Party.

Sir Richard Acland felt that we could only rearm in Western Europe at the expense of the so-called backward areas of Asia and Africa and would even then have to give them cheques for payment in some distant future. Leslie Hale, an able exponent of Walter Reuther's Plan, thought that the Colombo Plan for S.E. Asia would be wrecked, too, if we threw everything into an intense rearmament programme. He believed that we would get better dividends by devoting much of this expenditure to plans like that of Truman's Fourth Point.

Colleagues criticised strongly the censorship of Gen. MacArthur. It is a tradition of the British House of Com-

mons that war correspondents should be given responsibility *in ratio* with their status and it is the nucleus of a positive democracy that constructive criticism of the conduct of a war be part of their job and duty. More will be heard of this on the floor of the House when we meet. Democracies must be strong enough to bear criticism of themselves and their leaders, and many of us feel that the dispatches received here do not help our cause in Korea.

Despite the fact that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference was not able to settle the Kashmir problem it is certain that both Attlee and Nehru achieved personal triumphs at these meetings. The discussions proceeded on the assumption that war was not inevitable and the approach was that of seeking to prevent war—not to prepare for it. The purpose of the meetings was not to try and formulate a collective Commonwealth policy, but an attempt to find the extent of common ground between Commonwealth countries on which to base their policies at U.N. and elsewhere.

After a session had been devoted mainly to the question of a Peace Treaty with Japan it was considered that an early Peace Treaty would have a good effect upon the Asian situation as a whole, and the Prime Ministers felt that all the Powers which had been at war with Japan should take part in framing such a Treaty. Australia was undoubtedly cautious in her approach to the question of Japanese rearmament, and those M.P.s representing textile and pottery constituencies know only too well the reaction to any restoration of unfair Japanese economic competition.

The Declaration by Commonwealth Prime Ministers of the principles which had inspired the discussions was greeted by all the M.P.s with whom I discussed it as a great contribution to international understanding. These principles, if applied, should leave no doubt in the minds of Asia that the Commonwealth recognises the new national unities that have arisen in the Far East. They said:—

"In a world worn out and distorted by war, there must be an overwhelming majority of the people of all lands who want peace. We must not despair of reaching them. In all our discussions we have made it clear to each other as we do now to the world that as Commonwealth Prime Ministers we would welcome any feasible arrangement for a frank exchange of views with Stalin or with Mao Tse-tung. We should, in the name of common humanity, make a supreme effort to see clearly into each other's hearts and minds."

The United States of America can use the experience of the Commonwealth in the Far East, and here in the House many of us hope that America will see that the next great step in human progress is to join forces to annihilate the age-long hunger and misery of Asia so that her children can inherit her riches. If democracy fails to do this no atom bombs can save her.

* This article was written during the recess, before Parliament reassembled on January 23.

THE NEW GUINEA QUESTION

by B. Sluimers

Papuans from West New Guinea



WESTERN NEW GUINEA, until little more than ten years ago one of the forgotten countries in our well-explored world, attracted world-wide attention for the first time during World War II, when its soil, its shores and its air were the scenes of many decisive land, sea and air battles between the forces of the West and those of Japan. Its inhabitants, most of them still living in the Stone Age, must have watched these monstrous battles with horror and those in the coastal areas whose contact with civilisation had been limited to the few mission posts there, must have wondered why the holy white men came to their Papuan country to teach them that head hunting was an awful sin, whereas their own people killed each other in thousands . . .

Once the world had discovered that there was such a country as Western New Guinea it was drawn into the atmosphere of world politics and became an object of diplomatic and political discussions in the capitals of far-away countries. First of all it developed into a bone of contention between the newly-created state of Indonesia and Holland. Few of the New Guinea Papuans will ever have been aware that they were legal subjects to the Queen of Holland in the far North and even fewer will be able to understand why politicians at Djakarta claim that the Papuans are their close relatives, their blood-brothers without whose inclusion in their state they would feel their nation a mutilated one. Nevertheless, Papuans of Western New Guinea—they recently adopted a new name for themselves and their country and are Irians now which sounds much better than Papuan—who never travelled any farther but the distances their little fishing boats and canoes could take them, boarded gigantic airplanes and went as far as The Hague to state solemnly that their people wanted to live under the protection of Queen Juliana and the Dutch flag and others came to make it clear to the world that they were asking to join the Merdeka of President Sukarno's Republic of Indonesia. This happened at the time when a Dutch-Indonesian conference met to solve the question whether Western New Guinea, or Irian, was to remain

under Dutch sovereignty or under that of Indonesia. The Round Table Conference held at the end of 1949 at The Hague reached complete agreement on the very important question of Indonesian independence but was unable to decide in the far less important matter of Irian's future status. A new conference to be held before December 27th, 1950, was to reconcile the Dutch and the Indonesian standpoints. In the meantime another country showed itself deeply concerned with the problem of Irian's future. The Australian Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Spender, made it unmistakably clear that Australia never would agree to a transfer of Irian's sovereignty from the Dutch to the Indonesians. Australian interests, according to the Australian government, were involved to such an extent that she herself would claim sovereign rights over Irian should Holland wish to hand over her sovereignty to any other country. In view of the world situation Australia could not feel safe as long as Irian was not in trusted hands. Canberra evidently has full confidence in Holland, but the new Republic of Indonesia cannot be regarded in Australian eyes as a reliable guarantee of Australian strategic interests. The Second World War made it clear how easily the Eastern and Western parts of this gigantic island could be transformed from a defensive shield against an Asiatic invasion into a springboard for such an invasion.

The Americans too seem to be interested—and also for strategic reasons. The tide of anti-Western feelings in the Far East has risen so high, that few bastions for Western defence in territories under Asian rule can be regarded as safe. Contrary to the Australians however, the Americans have avoided making their ideas concerning Irian publicly known, but there is every reason to believe that there was more than a grain of truth in the assertion by Dutch representatives at The Hague Conference, that the U.S.A. are opposed to the transfer of sovereignty in the New Guinea area.

Indonesian claims are based on their rights as a revolutionary government to take over all the territories of the ousted colonial government. Juridically the Indonesians

refer to statements made by Dutch representatives in the Security Council, that Holland undertook to transfer its sovereign rights over the former N.E.I. *completely* to the new state of Indonesia. Irian, being a part of the former N.E.I. for that reason should have been included in the transfer of sovereign rights, decided upon at the Round Table Conference.

The Dutch on the other hand hold that Irian is not a part of the Indonesian Archipelago and geographically belongs to Australia and not to Asia. The Irian population, racially and culturally quite different from the Indonesians, have never been able to express their wish to part from the Dutch rule, such as the Indonesians have been able to do. Under these circumstances, Holland does not feel justified in relieving herself from her responsibilities towards the native population of Irian.

At the recent conference, which ended on December 27th, 1950, without results, Indonesia stated her willingness to safeguard all Dutch interests in Irian and to consider various concessions to the Dutch, but was tenacious as far as the principle of sovereignty was concerned. The Dutch suggested that sovereign rights should be held not by one of the partners in the Dutch-Indonesian Union but by the two partners commonly, under the condition however, that the Dutch would administer the country in the name of both the Union partners. This suggestion was flatly rejected by the Indonesians. An alternative proposal by the Dutch dealt with the possibility of a new conference in the near future when the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) should assist in finding a solution acceptable to both parties.

The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Rum, stated at the final session of the conference, that his delegation had no powers to accept or reject a proposal of this character. He added, that according to the Agreement of December, 1949, the *status quo* in Irian had been maintained with the full assent of his government. From December 28th, 1950, this agreement finished and Dutch rule in Irian is maintained against the will of the Indonesian Republic. The delegation from Djakarta made it clear that the Indonesian government regards Irian as part of Indonesian territory.

It is evident that this development has considerably strained Dutch-Indonesian relations, and it is doubtful whether it will be possible to maintain the Dutch-Indonesian Union under the Dutch crown. There has been quite a lot of agitation in Indonesia on this issue and threats of boycotting the Dutch in the former Dutch colonial empire have been announced publicly. It looks as if one more conflict in the Far East is going to make things worse in that troublesome part of the globe.

Diplomatic representatives of both England and India, deeply concerned with the situation, took steps to inform Indonesia and Holland, that a friendly solution of their differences would be in the interests of peace. These steps have not been able to prevent a collapse of the Conference. Both the Dutch and the Indonesians were unable to make any further concessions owing to the internal political situation in their respective countries, since the Irian question is regarded in both countries as one of national prestige.

Western New Guinea has been looked upon for some time by Dutchmen as a possible outlet for Holland's overpopulation and as an area to resettle many whites and Eurasians from the former Dutch colonies in Asia, who cannot feel at home any more in an independent Indonesia.

The native population of Irian is estimated between four and five hundred thousand, that is about 2 per square kilometre. Little more than a quarter of these are in any contact with or under control of the Dutch civil administration. There is a Dutch governor now at Merauke and at several places civil service posts have been established. Holland is willing to invest a large amount of capital in the development of the area. It is doubtful, however, whether Holland is in a situation to spend a considerable part of its national income on this enterprise and whether it is wise statesmanship to endanger the enormous investments of Holland in Indonesia by hanging on to the burden of a forgotten and hopeless country like Irian. But national prestige, irrational as it may be, is a political reality every government has to deal with and this is true for Holland as well as for Indonesia.

And the Irians themselves? They are the least interested in all the trouble they are causing. They go on shooting game with bows and arrows, fishing in the many rivers of their island and head-hunting occasionally as long as the white man does not interfere. However, this will not last, for civilisation is after them and they will be drawn into it, whether they like it or not.

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INDIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA

by G. H. Calpin (Durban)

THE 300,000 Indians domiciled in South Africa are undergoing a difficult time at the moment, trying to orientate their minds and their affairs to the most recent legislation passed by the Government. Faced with further restrictions, a few of them, notably of the Moslem trading class, are seriously considering removing their interests elsewhere—to Pakistan in some cases, and to India where Hindus are concerned.

The legislation which has set them thinking in terms of emigration is the Group Areas Act. Ever since South Africa became a nation in 1910, successive governments have engaged on the task of governing a huge majority of African Natives, now numbering 8,000,000, a minority of Indians congregated in certain territories, and a growing Coloured population of nearly a million. The traditional policy of the ruling white man is one of segregation of the races, and in so far as Natives are concerned this policy has long been established as the accepted treatment of our racial problems. In the case of Indians it has taken shape more gradually, though even in the early days there was a broad recognition in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State of the desirability of separating Indians from Europeans in residence.

As a result of the different policies adopted by the British Colonies (the Cape of Good Hope and Natal) and the Boer Republics (the Transvaal and the Orange Free State), Indians have long been restricted in their movements, and today are not allowed to pass from province to province for permanent residence. This explains why so many of them congregated in Natal, to which they were first brought as contract labourers in the middle of last century, and so few (not more than 30) in the Orange Free State. It is only in certain parts of the country where the presence of Indians constitutes a problem. In Durban, for example, there are as many Indians as there are Europeans, over 100,000, and it is in places like Durban where the contact of Europeans, Natives, and Indians is seen in its full significance, in housing problems, in commercial competition, and in those intangible relations between peoples of widely divergent languages, religions and cultures.

The fundamental problem raised by the presence of Indians concerns their numbers, the Indian birth-rate being almost twice that of Europeans, posing issues of great social magnitude to public authorities. This, in conjunction with the inevitable intrusions of one race upon another in residential areas and the competitive abilities of Indians in trade, has made of the Indian problem a national question impossible to answer in terms of Western democracy. Through the years various attempts have been made to cope with the problem, such as the encouragement of voluntary emigration and repatriation to India and the restriction of Indian ownership of property in what are looked upon as European areas. None of these attempts has succeeded in allaying the fears of Europeans; nor has

India's appeal to the United Nations brought much hope of amicable settlement.

Faced with this and even larger racial issues, the Nationalist Government conceived and passed the Group Areas Act. This legislation is the corner-stone of what is known as *apartheid*, the policy of separating the four races in South Africa residentially and socially and, as far as the economy of the country will permit, industrially and commercially. In the treatment of Indians the Group Areas Act is an extension of previous legislation passed by the government of which General Smuts was the head in 1943 and 1946. It will add further restrictions on economic freedom and will demarcate areas outside which Indians will not be allowed to trade or to own and occupy property.

The whole country, in fact, will gradually be brought under control, and within given areas, in the cities, for example, an endeavour will be made to rid mixed districts of their multi-racial character. Admittedly this project will require many years before the desired result is achieved, and inevitably great inconvenience and loss will accompany the changes. It is argued, however, that as racial conflict is inevitable on racial contact, the natural solution lies in imposing by statute the human tendency for people of the same race, culture, and religion to congregate together in distinct areas.

It would be foolish to suggest that no other factors enter the Government's considerations in this legislation. The Indian problem constitutes one of the gravest issues in South Africa. It is a complex of many factors and fears: factors concerning the future policy of Delhi in its relations with all Africa, as well as the inevitable fears caused by the presence of a rapidly-growing Asiatic population, not only in South Africa, but also in British East Africa. The problem, in fact, is continental, and Africa the only territory in the world where white, black, and brown races are in close and daily contact, and where the degrees of civilisation pass from barbarism to sophistication. South Africa happens to be a microcosm of this continental macrocosm, in which the accepted principles of Western democracy cannot be applied directly and unreservedly.

There is no easy accommodation of the problems which beset us, else it would have been found by such minds as that of General Smuts, whose negotiations with Mr. Gandhi in the early days, and whose legislative concepts more recently have all failed to solve what is now regarded as almost impossible of solution. For one thing, it is useless to approach the Indian problem in South Africa in isolation. It must be set against the Native problem, and indeed the relations between Indians and Natives are as pregnant with danger as those between Europeans and Indians.

Despite their disabilities, the restriction on their movements, the absence of political representation in local and central government, the restraints on their trading activities, Indians freely admit that they are, for the most

part, better off in South Africa than they would be in India, a fact, however, which does not prevent them from active political struggle. Politically, they are divided into two parties: the Congress Party, led by leftist-inclined professional men, embracing the workers and impelled by the desire to unite with Natives and Coloureds in a non-European militant front, and the Indian Organisation, a moderate party consisting of merchants and traders who seek some betterment of conditions by more constitutional means.

Both parties oppose the Group Areas Act in their respective ways and adopt such measures as will persuade the Governments of India and Pakistan to raise the dispute once more before the United Nations, the Assembly

of which has on three occasions debated it and called on South Africa to make suitable adjustments to resolve the problem. Some progress was made early this year in preliminary discussions between representatives of the three countries, when it was agreed to hold a round-table conference. The passing of the Group Areas Bill, however, caused Mr. Nehru to withdraw his support of the round-table conference, a decision he recently confirmed. The Government of Pakistan, on the other hand, whilst retaining its fundamental opposition to the new legislation, has voiced its willingness to participate in the conference, and it may be that the Union Government will take advantage of this willingness to examine the situation without reference to Delhi.

COMMUNIST THREAT TO THAILAND

by R. Y. Lee (Bangkok)

DURING the past year, Communist propaganda has made much progress in Thailand. Besides the two official papers belonging to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (the *Chuan min Pao*, or "people's paper") and the Thai Communist Party (TCP) (the *Mahaxon* or "Masses"), most of the other daily publications in Thai (namely the fortnightly *Maitrisarn*, the daily *Xieng Thai*) as well as in Chinese (for instance, the *Chung Nguan Pao*) are definitely influenced by extreme left wing ideas. However, propaganda work is still the only open activity of various Communist organisations in Thailand and the country, so far, has not yet experienced large scale demonstrations, meetings, strikes and sabotage. But is this dangerous silence an indication of the weakness of the Thai Communist parties or just a question of "party strategy"? The second interpretation is most probable for in the case of a southward drive by Mao's armies towards this rice bowl for the whole of nearly starving South-East Asia, Communist armies will find there a strong and organised fifth column. A general study of the Communist parties now existing in Thailand will perhaps give some idea of the danger which is threatening the country.

The Thai Communist Party (TCP). The Thai Communist Party came into the open again in December, 1946, after the repeal of the bill outlawing Communist activities in Thailand. The rebirth of the TCP was followed by the presence of a Communist leader, Nai Prasert Sapsunthorn, a representative from the Surathani province and former lecturer at the Chulalongkorn University, in Parliament. After the November 8 *coup d'état* which brought Pibul Songram into power he retired into private life to study the parallels existing between Communism and Buddhism. The programme of the TCP was rather moderate, based on "reconstructing the country and making it truly democratic and independent." Though the TCP controls the Central Labour Union (affiliated to the Communist-dominated W.F.T.U. and where Chinese labourers slightly outnumbered Thai workers) with the collaboration of the Chinese Communist Party, the TCP members number only 5,000 with some 300 well-trained militants. The most prominent

members of the TCP are: Nai Vas Sunthornchamorn, an ex-officer, who participated as the Thai delegate to the second assembly of the W.F.T.U. in Peking, Nai Thienthai Aphijataputr, President of the Central Labour Union, and Nai Sak Subhakasem of the *Mahaxon*, who is believed to be the theoretician of the Party. In view of the economic situation of the country, the progress of the TCP depends largely on the Chinese Communist Party in Thailand.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP, with headquarters in Bangkok, has now a membership of 50,000 with about one thousand well-trained militants. Immediately after the World War II, the leader of the party was able Major Chiu Chee, alias Nai Kou Kip. Since the November *coup d'état* and early in 1948 when Chiu Chee was reported to have been arrested by the Thai police, the leadership of the Party passed into the hands of Chua Chee Hong, editor of the *Chuan min Pao*, and his assistant, Tan Pia Jin, under the supervision of an envoy from the CCP in China named Huang Sheng. The CCP controls the Central Labour Union and organised secret armed units in North-Eastern and Southern provinces, but in view of the predominant place occupied by the Chinese in the economic system of Thailand, the CCP constitutes the most dangerous threat to the security of the country.

The Indo-Chinese Communist Party (Thailand and Laos branch). Although this branch of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party (ICP) has existed since the formation of this party (1930), it never attained any noticeable importance until the beginning of 1946 when 50,000 Vietnamese in Laos left the latter country to settle in Thailand as war refugees. They established themselves in the North-Eastern provinces and were well organised into political activities by a branch of the Communist-controlled Viet Minh League. The principal head of all the activities of Vietnamese in Thailand from 1946 to the November *coup d'état* was Moscow-trained Tran Van Giau, who studied at the Lenin University in 1931-1933 and who was Chief of the Executive and Resistance Committee in Cochin China immediately after the end of World War II. He left his home country (Cochin China) for Bangkok in the beginning of 1946 to organise

"overseas armed contingents for the salvation of the Fatherland." Tran Van Giau disappeared from Bangkok after the November *coup d'état* to become the head of the propaganda department of Ho Chi Minh's Republic. Though nearly 70 per cent of the Vietnamese now in Thailand are under the control of Ho Chi Minh's régime through the so-called "Vietnamese Mutual Assistance Association in Thailand," the membership of the ICP in Thailand is believed to be only 3,000 with a few hundred real militants. The prominent members of the ICP in Thailand are: a Vietnamese with a Siamese name: Som, believed to be the theoretician of the Party; Tran Van An, President of the

Vietnamese Mutual Assistance Association; Le Duy Luong, ex-professor in Laos Pavie College; Nguyenduc Quy, President of the Ho Chi Minh delegation in South-East Asia.

Although the Thai Communist Party is relatively weak and the Thai people, by reason of their religion and way of life, are less attracted to Communist ideology and practice, nevertheless the Communist threat to Thailand is a reality, mainly due to the existence on Thai soil of the two most dynamic and best organised Communist parties in Asia: the Chinese Communist Party and the Indo-Chinese Communist Party.

THE PARTITION OF BENGAL

by Sir Robert Reid

ONE major, some would say disastrous, result of the acceptance of the Two Nation theory in the Indian sub-continent is the bisection of two great provinces, Bengal and the Punjab. Unlike the Punjab, however, for Bengal this is no new experience. Her first partition came about almost by accident. In February, 1901, Sir Andrew Fraser, Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, wrote to the Government of India strongly recommending that recent orders making Hindi the court language of the District of Sambalpur should be reversed, and that Uriya, the native language of the inhabitants, should be restored. At the same time he emphasised that the true remedy for the difficulties of administering this one Uriya speaking district in the otherwise Hindi-speaking Central Provinces, was to attach it to the Orissa Division of Bengal.

For the space of fourteen months the file to which this letter gave birth perambulated the departments until, on a day in May, 1902, it was placed on the Viceroy's table with, for approval, a draft reply to Sir Andrew Fraser's inquiries. But the Viceroy was Lord Curzon, who had already conceived a marked dislike for the dilatory methods of the Indian Secretariat. Instead, therefore, of according his agreement to the proposed draft, he read the file from cover to cover and then recorded a long and devastating minute on the evils of departmentalism illustrated aptly by the history of this case. That famous "Round and Round Note" deserves an article to itself, but one extract must suffice:—

"People," he said, "sometimes ask what departmentalism is. To any such I give this case as an illustration. Departmentalism is not a moral delinquency. It is an intellectual hiatus—the complete absence of thought or apprehension of anything outside the purely departmental aspects of the matter under discussion. For fourteen months it never occurred to a single human being in the departments to mention the matter, or to suggest that it should be mentioned. Round and round like the diurnal revolution of the earth went the file, and now, in due season, it has completed its orbit, and I am invited to register the concluding stage."

Departmentalism thus disposed of, it was agreed that its native language should be restored to Sambalpur, and this was done, to the great satisfaction of its inhabitants and no less to that of the Chief Commissioner who had proposed this measure.

But the indirect results which flowed from this file and

its contents were of the first magnitude, for at Curzon's order a general examination of provincial boundaries was undertaken. Attention became focussed on conditions in Bengal, where the case for reconsidering provincial boundaries in the interests of good administration was overwhelming. In 1903 the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal covered an area of 189,000 square miles with a population of 78,000,000 and, as Sir Andrew Fraser on one occasion declared, "it had become practically impossible to conduct efficiently the administration of this great province." The remedy was obvious enough, namely to divide the unmanageable bulk of Bengal into small units so as to ensure that each should get its fair share of attention and of financial aid. Proposals for partition were first published in 1903, but did not take their final form until 1905. There was thus ample time for discussion and explanation—and ample time also for working-up the agitation which threw Bengal into a ferment of unrest which was to persist for years, and which was to sow the seeds of worse to come.

Two factors played an important part as background elements. First, the Bengali Hindu to which community the agitation was practically confined, is by nature highly excitable and emotional, easily carried away by a specious cry and ready to go to extraordinary lengths under the impulse of his emotions. Secondly, there had been a great stirring of nationalistic sentiment among Asian peoples following on the victory of Japan over Russia in the war of 1904-5. Among Indians there had arisen a new confidence in themselves and with it a new inclination to question the right of European nations to dominate Asians, while among Bengalis, in particular, there arose a desire to remove the long-standing reproach of being members of the "non-martial" races. Those vested interests, therefore, which foresaw in Partition severe material loss to themselves, found ready to hand just the atmosphere and just the material they needed. Among those vested interests the Calcutta Bar and the Calcutta Press stood most prominent. To the former the likelihood of a new High Court being set up in Dacca spelt the loss of the fees which formerly the Eastern Bengal litigants had been accustomed to spend in Calcutta, while to the latter the likelihood of a rival press growing up in the Eastern province equally meant financial loss.

On these foundations a formidable agitation was quickly built up. No calumny was too outrageous, no falsehood too extravagant to be pressed into service. Press and platform vied with each other in attributing the vilest motives to the British Government and their servants, and their powers of invention knew no bounds. In face of it, all attempts of the Government to explain and justify their intentions and their motives (Lord Curzon himself toured East Bengal in 1904) were in vain. The Government, however, rightly persisted in carrying out their plan, and in October, 1905, there was brought into being a new province entitled Eastern Bengal and Assam, with an area of 106,540 square miles and a population of 31 millions, 18 million Muslims and 12 million Hindus, with Dacca as its capital, and Shillong, in Assam, as its summer headquarters.

The agitation gradually died down and both Government and governed settled down to making a job of it, and there seemed every chance of the whole thing being forgotten. But in December, 1911, came a bolt from the blue in the announcement of the "boons" at King George V's Coronation Durbar at Delhi, one of which was a complete reversal of policy in Bengal. Eastern Bengal and Assam was abolished; East and West Bengal were re-united and raised to the status of a Presidency-Governorship, like Madras and Bombay; Bihar, Orissa and Chota Nagpur were cut off to form a new province; Assam reverted to its old status of a Chief Commissionership. And, biggest change of all, the Central Government removed itself from Calcutta to a new capital at Delhi. So what Morley once called the "settled fact" of the Partition was unsettled, but whether this boon was, on further consideration, as eagerly welcomed as its authors hoped, is open to doubt. The Mahommedan majority in East Bengal certainly felt they were being let down, and indeed much had to be done to conciliate them, such, for instance, as the pledge that Government would spend a fixed period in every year at Dacca. To the rest of India, who were never seriously interested in the feelings or the wrongs of the Bengalis, the important thing announced at the Durbar was the transfer of the Central Government to Delhi, away from the influence of Bengal.

In 1947 the scene changed. On August 15, 1947, British India disappeared and was replaced by India and Pakistan. Bengal, made up as it was, roughly, of a Western, Hindu half, and an Eastern, Muslim half, could not escape a fresh partition. But it was a different kind of partition and the methods employed had to be different. The leisurely approach of 1906, suitable enough for bureaucrats bent on improving the administration of a British India province, was of no use to politicians whose task it was to solve an urgent problem of international boundaries, and to parcel out Bengal between two separate autonomous states. The first partition had claimed the anxious attention of a Viceroy and his advisers for the best part of three years; the second was disposed of in about as many weeks by a Boundary Commission headed by an English barrister, who alone signed the award, since an agreed solution on the part of his two Hindu and two Mahommedan colleagues was found impossible. Bengal was carved in half vertically. Dacca became the capital of Eastern Bengal, as an outlying province of Pakistan, with Chittagong as its port. Calcutta remained the capital of the Indian Province of West Bengal.

The only yardstick in the new partition was the communal one, and tens of thousands of humble people, who found themselves on the wrong side of the boundary, felt that their only chance of survival lay in trekking this way or that across the border according to whether their religion was Hindu or Muslim. Fortunately there were not the wholesale massacres that occurred in the Punjab in 1947 (Bengal had had its blood-bath in Calcutta and Noakhali in 1946), but the loss, the misery and the suffering endured can never be accurately assessed.

But there was no agitation against the plan. There was instead an unquestioning acceptance of the new order of things, even by those who lost and suffered most. For the background of nationalistic feeling, of resentment at the rule of an alien European race, no longer existed. The struggle for Independence was ended, and this fresh bisection of Bengal was one of the conditions of that achievement, accepted by the political successors of those leaders who had been so fierce in their opposition to partition in days gone by.

Not least among the drawbacks of the new Partition are those dictated by nature. Eastern Bengal is a Muslim island in an Indian sea, far removed from the rest of Pakistan. Yet she in turn interposes a Muslim barrier between the main bulk of India and her easternmost component, Assam. Faced thus with obstacles to the natural flow of trade in almost every direction, both states set themselves to find ways to get round them. India built a new line of rail, connecting, at the cost of a long detour, Assam with India without touching Pakistan. To make herself independent of the port of Calcutta, East Pakistan proceeded first to develop Chittagong, and is now planning an entirely new port at Chalna further west. Formerly, East Bengal grew most of the jute and West Bengal manufactured it on the banks of the Hooghly. Now it became India's policy to grow enough jute for her needs, while East Pakistan has started to build jute mills on the Karnafuli. Similar examples could be multiplied, but these suffice to underline what happens when a Boundary Commission has to pay regard, not to nature or convenience, but first and foremost and all the time to communal statistics.

So the wheel has come full circle, but it has come to rest in circumstances which provoke speculation as to whether the last partition of Bengal is likely to be any more permanent than the first. West Bengal does not like it. This is what Mr. Nalini Ranjan Sarker, Finance Minister, said in introducing the Budget for 1950-51: "Neither the psychological nor the material fruits of freedom have come to the people of Bengal with any message of hope or good cheer. The result for many in the State has been a sullen aloofness on their part born of frustration and despair." There must be many in East Bengal too who do not like it either, but whether forces will ever emerge strong enough to overcome passions and prejudices rooted deep in communal and religious feeling is open to doubt. The deadlock arising out of the devaluation controversy is ominous evidence of those passions, nor is time necessarily a healer. Every loom that is erected in the new jute mills of Chittagong and every ton of goods carried on the Assam Link only serve to confirm and make more permanent the cleavage between the Eastern and the Western halves of erstwhile united Bengal.

AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA

by Marc T. Greene

THE Democratic setback in the recent American elections was tantamount, among other things, to an expression of popular disapproval of the Administration's Far Eastern policy. That poses two questions, of which the second is easier to answer than the first. What, exactly, is that policy? And why should the American people disapprove of it?

Let us examine, briefly, what up to now has mainly actuated and influenced the Democratic Far Eastern policy, more especially as that policy relates to China. Why has America persisted in defending and supporting the discredited regime of Chiang Kai-shek, clinging to the nebulous and attenuated Nationalist set-up which actually represents nothing, ignoring the realities of the position, and refusing any dealings with what at present, for better or worse, is the ruling Government of China?

The explanation of that is not so difficult to discover. Powerful American interests have been behind Chiang from the start, that is to say, from his repudiation of his Communist following and associates, in Hankow, in 1927. The fact is, that these interests had much to do with that repudiation.

They are largely trading interests. After the end of the late war China was looked upon as perhaps the greatest of all exploitable fields for American industry. Clearly the exploitation of this enormous trading potential depended upon a Chinese Government friendly to American Big Business. The latter knew and understood Chiang Kai-shek as "a man you could deal with." It was, therefore, necessary to back him to the end, since with his enemies, the Communists, in power it was likely that it would be Russian, and not American, Big Business that would reap the rich potential harvest.

American Big Business is powerfully represented in Congress, nor are its representatives there by any means confined to Republicans. But the latter are most numerous and articulate. None is more articulate than Senator Knowland of California, who, a prominent West Coast attorney, has many wealthy Chinese clients, traders with the home country whose interests have suffered badly and will continue to while a Communist Government rules.

Other powerful interests which, if not actually more powerful than Government, exert a very strong influence thereon, are represented by such as Senators Wherry, Bridges, Brewster and McCarran. The first three are Republican, the fourth Democratic, but all are bitter foes of the Administration. These, and others, will fight the strongest kind of rear-guard action against any attempt to abandon Chiang and what is left of his regime. They have been and will continue to be joined in this by others, Republican and Democratic alike, who, hostile to the Truman Government in principle, lose no opportunity to embarrass it.

This element, far from satisfied even with the Administration's refusal so far to recognise the Chinese Communist Government or with the warning off of the latter from

Formosa, are constantly fearful of a more realistic China policy on the part of the Democrats, of possible concessions to the Communists and of a definite abandonment of Chiang. Security against this they are only sure of under a Republican régime, therefore they brought up their heaviest artillery, well ammunitioned, in the attempt to weaken and discredit the Truman Administration in the late elections, one of the main issues having been that Administration's "vacillating" Far Eastern policy.

Vacillating it appears to have been throughout, truly enough. But the fact is that such a tendency has been due far more to the embarrassing opposition as outlined above than to any uncertainty on the part of the present Administration as to the policy that *should* be followed.

It is a fact that there are many in the Administration and in the Congress who would have favoured and supported a recognition of the Chinese Communist Government after the Korean Communists had been so decisively defeated in southern Korea and driven in a rout past the 38th Parallel. There was a feeling that Nehru's view, that now was the time to parley, with some hope of reaching an agreement and ending the grave danger of war on a larger scale, was entitled to consideration, and that a recognition of Communist China, not now granted under duress of any sort, would open the way.

That would, of course, have meant the final end of Chiang, and the Republican and Democratic "Old Guard" were alike up in arms at the very suggestion. The point was made a vital issue in the campaign and the Truman Administration was charged with "trucking to the Communists," or preparing to truckle.

The aforesaid interests have some seven-eighths of the media of publicity in the United States under their control and available for propaganda. It gave special attention to a discrediting of the Administration on the Far Eastern, and particularly upon the Chinese, question. This, coming at a time when the Communist spectre grimly stalks the slumbers of most Americans, secured a large and attentive hearing and so played a vital part in the elective decisions, perhaps quite as vital as the issues of the high and increasing cost of living, the alleged delinquency of the Truman regime in "purging" Communists and other "dangerous radicals" out of the Government itself, and the "continued support by America of a Europe that refuses to make the proper efforts to support itself," one of the pet phrases of the isolationist group.

The average American knows next to nothing about the Far East. With the best intentions in the world in respect of objectivity and open-mindedness he has no choice but to depend for his information upon the various publicity recourses open to him. This, of course, gives an overwhelming advantage and an easily-grasped opportunity to the owners and controllers of those recourses. Never was an opportunity more effectively utilised than this one in the recent elections, which affords plenty of explanation why the American people turned thumbs-down on the Admini-

stration's China policy as "weak," "vacillating," "playing into the hands of the Communists" and "cringing before Soviet Russia."

As we have seen, the foreigner unfamiliar with the more obscure nooks and corners of the American political scene and with the character and power of the interests that play an all-important background part in it, contemplates American Far Eastern policy with perplexity and wonderment. Just what is it? On what is it based? Why does it so consistently juggle with the facts and dodge the realities of the position? Why does it appear to be one thing today and another thing tomorrow?

All this and still more that is inexplicable appears to characterise American Far Eastern policy in the eyes of the European. The explanation that the policy is subject to so many different influences and, as determined upon from time to time, open to so many violent and vicious attacks

that it is next to impossible under existing political conditions in the United States to establish and maintain it securely and undeviatingly is not an explanation either understandable or acceptable to the foreigner, especially to the Britisher.

And now that the Truman Administration is so weakened by Democratic losses in the Congress what seems to be vacillation in Far Eastern policy is pretty certain to be even more marked during the next two years. America is now as good as committed, by this latest electoral verdict, to what most foreigners, and certainly most Englishmen, will regard as a reactionary policy in China, and that is not the policy that is most likely to avoid further entanglements and possible large scale conflict. But the Knowlands and the Wherrys and the Bridges will be certain to insist upon "no trucking with the Communists," even to the cannon's mouth.

THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF TIBET

by Major-General J. R. Hartwell, C.B., D.S.O.

UNTIL the commencement of the 20th century little international interest was taken by the Western Powers in Tibet, dismissed by them as the "Roof of the World" over the inhospitable near-half-million square miles of which its less than two million inhabitants either practised the mild and emasculating cult of Lamaism or wandered as nomad shepherds trading spasmodically with Mongolia, China and India. Although the slopes of the Sanpo were farmed by a population of cultivators who retained much of the hardihood and warlike characteristics of the Mongolian together with an appreciable sense of Tibetan nationalism, this fact was largely overlooked but may still play its part in the future development of the "political" alignment of Sikkim and Bhutan.

The powers mainly concerned with Tibet since the occupation of the Indian Peninsula by the British, together with its S.E. appendages of Burma and Malaya, have of course been China, the British Empire, and in a lesser degree Russia. In order to trace the changed complexion of the interest now taken in this area by all these (substituting if one must the Indian Republic for Britain) it is necessary briefly to evaluate the way in which each power regarded Tibet. In the case of the vast landmass of China under the Manchu Dynasty, Tibet was merely an unremunerative "province" over which a mild suzerainty was held which it seemed in the interest of no other power to challenge, nor of China, who had no expansionist aims at least westward, to exploit. It is true that Sun Yat Sen at the time of the 1911 revolution laid fresh claim to Tibet, as also to Burma and Siam, but the one seemed to have little more practical significance than the other, although today it is interesting to bear the latter claims in mind. It should be noted, however, that the events which led to the Young-husband expedition in 1904 almost certainly stemmed from a renewal of Chinese interest, through Tibet, in India's N.E. frontier with special relation to the Brahmaputra valley. This expedition resulted in British influence becoming predominant in Tibet at the cost of that of China, whose suzerainty was revoked, although this revocation was never accepted by China. Sino-Tibetan infiltration into Assam has continued steadily if slowly up to the present time.

As regards Russia, the Chinese province of Sinkiang was still Chinese-controlled and Russia's expansionist aims pointed towards Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf in the West and

Mongolia and Manchuria in the East. Tibet led her nowhere except to the then impenetrable barrier of the Himalayas, and even when her over-riding influence penetrated to Kashgar and Sinkiang at much the same time as she gained control of Mongolia, Tibet served no purpose other than that of a buffer between herself and China proper with whom, of course, her relations were consistently uneasy over her Mongolian and Manchurian expansion of "influence" during most of the period in question.

It was in the same light, that of a "buffer," an outer buffer, that Tibet was regarded by the British. The Himalayas, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan seemed sufficient guarantee that an effective inner buffer existed. Later her East flank was protected by occupation of the Abor and Miri tribal area, with the barrier of Naza and Lushai hills and jungles supporting the Burmese lowlands.

What, then, has altered the approach of all three Powers, or let us for simplicity say the British Commonwealth and the Communist bloc, to the strategical value of the physical occupation of Tibet in the most recent year? Let us examine these on the lines of (a) the Geographical approach, (b) the causes actuating the Communist bloc, and (c) the dangers inherent to the Indian Republic in a Communist-controlled Tibet, before considering what steps can be taken to counteract the dangers of Communist occupation.

(a) *The Geographical Approach.* It has been said man cannot alter geography. But it can be, and is being, rapidly and increasingly conquered or negated. Deserts in the mechanical and air age no longer have their old protective value; neither have mountains, rivers or seas. The bulldozer, combined with other advances in engineering, make comparatively light work of the driving of communications through the most mountainous country; the construction of air strips is a matter of days. The advance in knowledge of how to sustain life and operate in arctic conditions has lately advanced incalculably, mainly under Russian initiative*. As far as Tibet is concerned the conquest, so far as we know, is not yet complete, since the operation of aircraft from altitudes of over about 8,000 feet presents difficulties not yet over-

* It is interesting to learn from American sources that members of the Russian Arctic Forces are believed to be accompanying the Chinese advance into Tibet.

come. But it would be foolish indeed to imagine that, confronted with this as a problem of military urgency, modern ingenuity will not very soon find a solution. Such limitations do not, even now, refer to projected and guided missiles, and the general public has little or no information as to what lengths have been reached or may shortly be anticipated in their development. Tibet cannot, therefore, any longer be regarded as isolated for military purposes either from the Indian Peninsula in the case of Communist attack on the latter, nor from India in a defensive light or even as a base from which Sinkiang, Mongolia and China proper can be molested. In case such considerations are thought to be too futuristic it must of course be remembered that the foregoing deals only with the *new* geographical assessment contingent upon modern scientific advance. The old trade routes from the Brahmaputra valley eastwards still exist and as already stated can now be rapidly developed. The border of the Himalayas can still be invaded from Tibetan bases and the occupation of that country by an aggressive Power must increase the immediate danger to India's N.E. frontier far beyond anything known in the past.

(b) *The Communist Strategic Conception.* The trend of Communist strategy in the Far and Middle East indicates an intention to isolate the Indian Peninsula rather than absorb it at an early date either by military or psychological invasion. The "pincers" for such an operation are the landmass of Indo-China, Siam, Burma and Malaya on the East and Iraq and Iran on the West. But this operation has a certain danger if counter measures based on India and Pakistan are taken on an adequate scale, and the security of such counter measures would be greatly increased if Tibet was joined by good communications with India and developed as a defensive-offensive potential especially if and when the physical domination of India is attempted. But we know only too well that the "direct approach" by way of physical warfare is not the most favoured of the Kremlin's tactics. To avoid the risk of undue repetition, however, it will perhaps be better to consider the value of Tibet in the psychological strategy of both sides when considering the dangers to the British Commonwealth of a Communist domination of that land.

(c) *Danger to the Indian Republic.* The physical dangers have already been discussed under (b) above. Of the two, the psychological results may prove the more dangerous and by far the more immediate; dangerous in removing the historic buffers between India and aggression from the N. and N.E., to which control of Tibet provided only the outer and less considered buffer, as already stated. In order to evaluate the position as it is at present it is necessary to consider the accord or otherwise which exists between the Indian Republic and the people forming the inner buffer, namely Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and the N.E. Frontier Tracts of Assam. And finally relations between India and Pakistan with special reference to the Sudan and Jhelum Valleys.

Of the peoples on India's N. frontier by far the most important are, of course, the Nepalese and of these, martially, those of the purer Mongolian stock. Their over-riding importance is admirably set out in Lt.-Gen. Sir Francis Tuker's masterly book, "While Memory Serves," and I venture to use his conclusion on this point while bringing them into focus with the most recent developments between India and Nepal and their possible consequences.

First, then, as regards Nepal herself. Here we have the rather curious position of a people the vast numerical majority of whom are of much the same stock as the Tibetan-Mongolian but whose "policy" is guided by a Durbar with strong ethnological, economic and geographical affiliation with India, and, in the past, the closest ties with the British. Relations with Tibet have not been friendly and, jealous as Nepal has always been, and increasingly so since the British evacuation of India, of any interference in her internal affairs from across



Tibetan Warrior

her frontiers, her trust in the British connection allayed most fears from the South, whereas she seems to have appreciated the danger to herself of Chinese claims in Tibet (and incidentally Nepal) at a truer value than did others. Before proceeding with the question of the lack of wisdom of any action by India liable completely to estrange Nepal it is best to see the full possible consequences of such folly as affecting India's Northern frontier further East.

Immediately eastward of Nepal lies Sikkim, part of the Indian Republic. This position has long been resented by the Sikkimese who share the Gurkhas' view of the plainsman of India, with whom they have no racial or cultural affiliation whatever. If autonomy is not to be had they would certainly prefer incorporation with Nepal, to whom they are closely related in race and language and whose people have spread into Sikkim and now form well over half of the population of the area; or, if this is impossible, even with the Mongolian peoples to the North and North-East.

The case of Bhutan is rather different. They are a lethargic people, as closely allied to the Tibetan as the Sikkimese to the Gurkha and looking spiritually to China and Tibet. But here also the Nepalese infiltration, if not influence, is very strong. The sub-mountain areas are rapidly being colonised by Gurkhas whose tendency is always to spread eastwards, even into Assam. There is considerable racial resemblance between the Gurkha and the people of Assam's N.E. frontier tracts, and both regard the Indian in much the same light.

Here, then, is the set-up on India's Northern frontier, and it is the Gurkha far more than the Indian influence which is predominant and rapidly becoming more so. It is against this background that Pandit Nehru has elected to do his best to alienate the Nepal Durbar. It is obscure why he risked such action, but as has been suggested elsewhere it may have been to strengthen his position, to ingratiate himself with the Gurkha population of the Darjeeling-Sikkim area whose relations with the Nepal Durbar have lately not been of the happiest, and with the Nepalese Congress Party, although paradoxically, this is almost certainly Communist controlled. What we are concerned with are the possible results. Such interference is likely either to result in a cleavage between the Gurkhas of Nepal proper and those of Sikkim and Bhutan, thus fatally weakening any co-ordinated Northern defence line, or else in Nepal, in India's despite, incorporating these districts in herself and, since she *must* look outwards, looking North rather than South for deliverance from economic isolation. This would indeed produce an ugly situation for the Indian Republic.

Sir Francis Tuker has suggested that the solution from the Indian point of view would be a "Mongolian" federation under Nepalese leadership from Nepal to Eastern Bhutan, presumably extending for co-ordination of defence to the Naga hills. There is no question but that from the military point of view this is the best if not indeed the only sound solution. It would of course entail much work on the improvement of communications leading to the Tibetan border and eventually no doubt beyond, and above all (alas! for its chances) on real statesmanship together with economic assistance to Nepal

bringing a betterment of the relations which have lately so sadly deteriorated since the British evacuation. Here perhaps is the chance for the British Government to make amends, in the rôle of honest broker, for the cynical, short-sighted and even dishonourable way in which our ally Nepal's well-being and interests were disregarded in the terms for Indian independence.

Lastly, the existing state of affairs between India and Pakistan must cease if the defence of the Peninsula's Northern frontier is to be secured. Apart from difficulties arising from the last partition of Bengal the Kashmir question is outstanding. Not long ago there were circumstantial reports of Chinese forces advancing into Tibet from Sinkiang. In recent weeks these seem to have vanished into the mists which traditionally shroud this area, but the potential at least remains. The Indus and Jhelum Valleys would present no insurmountable difficulties to Chinese forces whose mobility and effectiveness without mechanical aids has lately been most effectively demonstrated. And some fair roads from Gilgit, Chitral and the Jhelum valley already exist. It would be a sadly Gilbertian situation which saw India and Pakistan fighting each other for the right to resist aggression from this direction, yet at present could any useful combination for defence between the two Dominions be envisaged? It is perhaps true that the Communist bloc does not propose to make strategic use of Tibet for some years to come; it is in fact the writer's belief that they do not consider that such action, physically, will ever be necessary—the Peninsula will be encircled and fall of its own weakness. But they mean to be prepared. Do we?

AN ASIAN POINT OF VIEW

by Lo Hsiao-chien

IN estimating the feeling of the people of Asia and their sense of what is right in a given instance, it must not be assumed straight away that the moral conscience of Asia is exactly the same as the moral conscience of the West (the climate of conscience changes with every geographic, sociological, and historical development. Even the moral conscience of France or Italy is different from that of Britain). The fundamental sense of what is right is, of course, the same everywhere; but because of a difference in background, the standpoint is different. Because of a difference in standpoint, the intellectual bias and emotional response are different. Because of a difference in bias and response the moral conscience in a given instance can become quite different. This will be so, so long as we are human.

Take the U.N. action in Korea. From the western point of view its legality rests on the majority decision in the Security Council and the Assembly, in spite of the absence of Russia and China, the two neighbouring countries which have the most at stake in any settlement in Korea. From the Chinese point of view, it is simply a high-handed action precipitated by the U.S. in the name of the United Nations for the sake of its own illegitimate strategic interests. The defeat and destruction of North Korea is seen from the Chinese angle as not unlike the beating up and crushing of a young boy in front of China's very doorstep by a ganging up organised by the U.S. under the very big banner of International Law and Order, which was to be followed by the installation of an unfriendly,

disreputable type under China's very window. It is all as clear and straightforward as that. What puzzles China is the reason why the West should lack even the minimum perception or an elementary sense of justice in realising this; what amazes her even more is that the West is not ashamed of beating up a tiny country of not more than five years old, with the resources of fifty nations, and in doing so to inflict over 300,000 casualties. Can China, with her new-found pride and unity, and as mother nation of the Far East, stand aside without raising a finger? (Could Britain stand aside if Ireland were similarly treated by countries who had hardly heard of her, in spite of the fact that northerners may have committed the sin of crossing into Eire?) Hence I feel that what action China has taken for North Korea, she has taken it as much out of moral indignation, as out of the need of defending her legitimate interests. She has gone to the aid of North Korea, like an older boy to the aid of a young one, at the risk of no less than his own destruction, for it must be remembered that there is a feeling of brotherhood between the nations of the Far East, just as there is between the nations of the West.

At this present critical phase of development in Asia, what then is the line of policy which the West should pursue? I think British policy in India and Burma is still the classic example of how the West can act; in other words, gracious withdrawal, and the affording of material and technical aid. To be convincing, the withdrawal must be decisive

and ungrudging, and the offering of assistance disinterested and generous. The advantages of such a line of policy may not be at first apparent, but in the long run it will no doubt pay dividends. This can be seen so clearly from the acute difference between India's and China's attitude towards the West. India received her independence by an act of foresight and generosity on the part of Britain, hence the normality of the relationship between the two countries and the growing friendship which the Indians have for the British. In the last years of China's struggle for her unity and independence, she has had to fight against the U.S. intervention on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek. Hence China's total distrust of the West.

What Asia wants, in fact, at this juncture is no more than "live and let live," an aspiration which should not be too difficult to satisfy. Genuine friendship can flourish only after that condition is fulfilled. But "live and let live" can hardly be practised in Asia while Western armies are encamped and battling all along its shores, under various names, banners and principles. After all, what is cooking in Asia now is essentially an Asian stew. Too many outside hands extended to "help" (while the brain is occupied with totally irrelevant thoughts, such as prestige, finance, global strategy, etc.), however good the intention, may spoil the stew. Since in the end it is the Asian people who have to eat the stew, why not let them do their own "cooking"? Hence so many Asian voices are raised in protest whenever any clumsy outside hands are extended to meddle in the Asian pot.

A drawback of the West in its pre-occupation with the developments in Asia, is its hyper-sensitiveness towards its own particular obsessions, which to Asians may not have the same meaning. The obsession which has taken hold of the West at the moment is, of course, the usual red-bogey. In considering the Asian

problem the West seems to forget that the requirements of the Asian diet and appetite can be quite different from that of the West. The "red pepper" may be too hot for the Western stomach, and will burn his tongue, but a judicious use of it has been known to produce some remarkably successful dishes in the East (such as in China) and may be indispensable in some Asian diets.

It seems, therefore, that the wisest attitude for the West to have towards Asia is one which should be attendant at all births, that of sympathy and readiness to assist—and in the present great birth of a continent, in the process of which not one nation is born, but many, one of tolerance and generosity (even if slightly calculated!) as well as one of wonder and awe, for all births and creations are sacred and miraculous and must command wonder and awe from all mortals. Translated into action three months ago, it would have meant the holding of the reins on the 38th Parallel—a point which would have greatly strengthened the U.N. moral position and prestige which means everything in Asia today but which would have been most certainly opposed by all militarists. How right was Nehru when he said, "War is too serious a matter to be left in the hands of military men!" Translated into action at this eleventh hour, it means the immediate and unconditional admission of China into the U.N. for an overall discussion with a view to a general settlement in Eastern Asia and the Pacific.

The substance of the United Nations latest cease-fire proposal, therefore, represents a big step towards sanity in international relations, and is not by any means compromising before force. It might have saved a great deal of wastage in lives and emotions if presented at the time when the first cease-fire proposal was presented a month ago. Every action is twice as purposeful when acted upon at its most effective time.

CHINESE TURKESTAN

by *Nripen Ghosh*

CHINESE TURKESTAN—Marco Polo's Kashgaria—is officially known as Hsinchiang whose exact area, generally estimated at five to six hundred thousand square miles, is still unknown. In its deserts European explorers discovered ancient cities and the "Cave of a Thousand Buddhas."

For centuries many Indians—both saints and banias—have crossed over the precipitous mountain passes of the Karakoram in search of God and gold respectively. They performed this superhuman feat as a matter of course. Hence all the books on this ancient land are written by European visitors, Huen Sang being the only exception.

People of Turkestan think of themselves as Hamian, Khotani, Yarkandi, Turfani and so on. The population is too scattered and its Chinese rulers too wise to permit the growth of the idea of nationhood. There are nearly five

thousands Indians settled there. Of the total population of 4,360,000 nearly 430,000 are Chinese, and the rest are Turkis, Qazaks, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Mongols (Lamaistic), Tungans (Chinese-speaking Moslems). The number of nomads is reckoned to be 500,000; nomads according to the western sense of the term.

The Indo-Sinkiang border is still undefined. Thanks to the Himalayas and the Karakoram mountains, no military invasion of India across this border is possible.

The foundation for the modernisation of Sinkiang was first laid by the Provincial Governor, Marshal Yang, in 1911. His first task was the suppression of rebel groups by force and negotiation, for the Tungans, Kirghiz, Qazaks and Turkis were always likely to be pawns of Russia against the Central Government.

Yang invited foreign surveyors, improved roads,

introduced motor cars, an engineering works and an electric power station. Above all, he kept the province out of the influence of the conflicting forces of central China. This Russia disliked most, for a Sinkiang in eternal chaos would be of more help to her than one enjoying peace and order. Marshal Yang was assassinated on 7th July, 1928, while distributing prizes in the Russian language school.

The new Governor, Chin Shu Jen, tried to confiscate the lands of the Turki peasant and give them to the Chinese settlers in the Hami area which led to a Turki uprising (1929).

The Turk-Siberian Railway was opened in 1930. The nearest Chinese railhead is 1,500 miles from the capital, whereas the Russian one is situated within 50 miles of its border. The effect on commerce and psychology can easily be guessed.



Kirghiz leads wool caravan from China to Russia

Governor Chin contracted a secret loan with Russia. (1931). Later he was tried on the charge of secret dealing with a foreign power and condemned to four years of imprisonment.

Chin was succeeded by General Sheng Shi Tsai who was released from a Siberian prison by the Russians in 1933. Turki insurrection broke out just at the time of his succession and the Japanese motorised division advanced up to Jehol.

The insurrection was led by the able Tungan (Chinese Moslem) officer Ma Chung Ying. It was rumoured that he had Japanese advisers with him.

Since any Moslem victory in Chinese Turkestan would have seriously affected the Moslem subjects in the Russian counterpart and they might have tried to bring down the Russian rule, Russia came to Sheng's aid.

General Sheng was granted a loan of 500,000 gold roubles, small arms, ammunition and Russian "advisers." In exchange Russia secured the rights to certain natural products and the monopoly of Karakul sheepskin. Indian trade came to a standstill owing to official harassment.

The insurrection made considerable progress. Tungans were joined by the Turki peasants. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, still fighting half a dozen wars, despatched a mission for conciliation under Colonel Huang. General Sheng executed three of his staff officers. Rebels were only 30 miles from the capital city, Urumchi.

Russian planes, troops and armoured cars took them from the rear. Bolshevik Russia made a special appeal to fifty thousand White Russian soldiers living in Urumchi. Officers and soldiers responded as one. General Dutoy—himself a refugee from Russia—took up the command and fought the rebels alongside his Bolshevik brethren.

On the banks of the Tutung, the battle raged with unabated fury. Russians were for the moment stupified to find themselves outmanoeuvred by the savagely mobile Turki cavalry. But bombs were a different proposition and they carried the day. At the same time in Moscow, Marshal Stalin was speaking to the 17th Congress of C.P.S.U., "We stand for peace and champion the cause of Peace." And a month before, Mr. Litvinoff, explaining the peace policy of Russia in the League of Nations' Assembly, referred to "Strengthening of our frontiers and transferring thereto the military forces and taking other measures."

Attacked from three sides, the rebels had only one way left to them—retreat. General Ma Chung Ying withdrew his forces along the way to Kashgar with Government troops and the Russian armoured column advancing via the Aksu and Maralbashi route. Turkis and Tungans parted company. The situation developed fast.

On July 5th, Ma ordered evacuation towards Yarkand and himself slipped into Russian territory with the first Secretary of the Consulate. He remains a prisoner there.

General Sheng had to pay the bill now. To start with, the Indian Frontier henceforth was to be guarded by Russian units, and a Russian garrison in Chinese uniform was to be stationed at the capital. An aviation school and a military academy were opened and a Soviet trade agency—SOVINTORG—was given the monopoly of Sinkiang trade. Road building, irrigation, army training schools and hospitals were brought under Russian supervision. Russians built for themselves exclusive hostels on the road, air fields and assembly points. Traffic shifted from the left side of the road in China to the right side of the road as in Russia. They drilled oil which rarely reached the General's capital. Women were compelled to go unveiled.

Sheng took the initiative in organising the anti-imperialist society of which he himself became the head. He applied for membership of the Comintern and was told that there could be no such membership and he should apply to the Chinese Section. The General kept silent.

Unnoticed by the Russian "advisers," an intelligentsia had meanwhile grown up in quantity and quality around the modernised civil service, machine shops and 1,556 schools. They witnessed the deadly tentacles of Russia thrown around the neck of the small and weak nations like Bukovina, Byellorussia, Bessarabia, Baltic States and Finland. They also witnessed the jointly planned and executed attack on Poland by Russia and Germany.

The Russo-Nazi honeymoon did not last long. Germany attacked Russia. Russian "aid" stopped. She could no

longer offer any equipment to China and much less to Sinkiang.

General Sheng acted in the spring of 1942. All the Russians in the province were rounded up and hurled out beyond Tienshun. Immediately after this, his brother who was the C.-in-C. of the provincial troops was assassinated.

In this part of the world, time and news move very slowly but rumour moves faster. The people were expecting a Russian retaliation at any moment. It was reported that Russia would first provoke a civil war in the north and then enter the country on the pretext of saving it from Japanese imperialism. On August 28th, Governor Sheng arrested all the pro-Russian elements. After two days, a plane arrived at the capital with Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

What went on between the Governor and Madame Chiang was never known, but within a few hours of their meeting all available channels of communication—including wireless, telephone and telegraph—were used for sending instructions wherever the hands of the government could reach. Up went the picture of Chiang Kai-shek and down came the picture of Stalin. The Anti-Imperialist Society dissolved itself and a section of the Kuomintang was formed.

Meanwhile another Turki revolt was in progress in the north led by a Turki teacher Ahmad Jan Kasimov—a Soviet citizen. The timely intervention of the centre brought the Ili district back to Sinkiang. General Sheng resigned and was immediately transferred to Chungking as the Minister of Agriculture. The Governor was henceforth to be appointed directly by the centre.

An agreement was signed between the Central Government and Ahmad Jan Kasimov. Turkis got local autonomy and Mahmud Sabri was appointed as the Governor of the whole province.

Mahmud, who studied medicine in Istanbul was quite different from the Turki teacher Kasimov. He was exiled during the Russian domination from 1934 to 1944 and his

appointment as the local Governor appeared to be something very bright in the eyes of the Turkis.

Russia started disliking Sabri from the very outset. His effort to develop a real unity between his own race and others appeared dangerous to Moscow.

Russia called back Kasimov who was deserted by the Turkis, Sabri and Chiang Kai-shek. He repudiated the Tihwa agreement and worked up another revolt. Ili was once more sealed off from the rest of Sinkiang. It became virtually a Russian protectorate. The newly-appointed Provincial Governor could do nothing more than put up notices requesting the rebels not to murder government officials.

The only guarantee of peace remained with the well-equipped provincial army of 75,000 strong, raised under the direct leadership of the Whampoa veterans.

Both the army and the people—though heterogeneous in composition—had one thing in common, a vigorous dislike of foreign rule. Kazaks, Uzbeks, Tajaks and Turkis are mostly emigres from Russian-occupied Central Asia after the Bolsheviks took over. Torgut Mongols who emigrated to the Volga region returned again to China to escape Czarist oppression. Manchurians moved into this province as the Japanese advanced on their homeland. All of them disliked the Chinese, the ruling race, but none of them had any reason for liking Russia.

A country of which 95 per cent is desert may not interest Russia, but its mountains are strewn with gold and other mineral resources. The annual output of gold is 50,000 ounces.

Russia's major difficulty in incorporating Sinkiang within the U.S.S.R. is neither the hostile population which she knows how to tame, nor the absence of a strong Communist Party, but the vast number of Moslem subjects in Central Asian republics. History tells us that every time Russia mobilised her troops to attack Sinkiang, the Moslem population of Central Asia rose against their Russian Masters.

SARDAR VALLABHBHAI PATEL

by B. Krishna (Delhi)

IN the death of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel at the age of 75 on December 15, 1950, India lost an illustrious son whose dominance in home politics was second only to that of Mahatma Gandhi. His was a most eventful life—a life crowded with perhaps too many achievements, all of which were primarily aimed at giving concrete shape to the dreams of his master, Gandhi—the country's freedom and its consolidation after 1947.

Patel was no philosopher or thinker like his master; he was a born fighter—a quality which he had inherited from his father, who is reported to have played a prominent part in the Indian Mutiny of 1857. He came under the spell of Gandhi in 1916 when he was 41, and two years later he figured prominently as the leader of the Kaira *satyagraha* in Gujarat. Gandhi was looking for someone who could take command of the battle, and in Patel he found a most able and trusted General. The *satyagraha* was a great suc-


cess for it laid the foundations of a new system of political education based on the Gandhian principles of truth and non-violent non-co-operation. Even Gandhi wrote that "through the Kaira campaign, *satyagraha* took firm root in the soil of Gujarat."

But Kaira was only a portent of what was to come and Patel excelled himself in each of the battles that followed, whether at Borsad in 1922, Nagpur in 1923 or Bardoli in 1928. On each occasion he came out victorious with the use of the weapons his master had given him—weapons of truth, love and non-violence.

In 1922, in Borsad in Gujarat, a strange situation had arisen. Dacoities and murders were being committed in broad daylight, but the police were ineffective in dealing with these outbreaks. The Government was therefore forced to post an additional police force, but at the same time it imposed a punitive-tax. Patel considered this an insult to

the people, since it meant that the Government held them partly responsible for the crimes. With a volunteer corps of over 200, he encamped at Borsad. Volunteers were posted in every village to keep strict vigilance, and unity was fostered among the people with the result that the dacoit menace ended very soon. Patel, however, declared it a victory for both the people and Government, since the latter, for the first time, openly acknowledged its mistake without the least hesitation. It was, indeed, truly Gandhian, but it also bore witness to Patel's large-heartedness.

Compared to Borsad, the *satyagraha* at Nagpur, the following year, was of far greater importance because the prestige of the National Flag was at stake. An apparently small issue—the prohibitory order of the Nagpur District



Magistrate against taking out the Flag through the Civil Lines—soon developed into an all-India struggle. Again it fell to the lot of Patel to be the supreme commander. He so conducted the campaign that it came to a successful end after three and a half months.

But a far greater victory awaited Patel a few years later—in 1928 in Bardoli. The Bardoli *satyagraha* arose out of the peasants' refusal to pay the enhanced rate of land revenue and the Government's threat to attach and auction defaulters' lands, cattle and other property. Patel, to whom the people turned for leadership, accepted the Government's challenge. Even *patwaris* and other village officials joined the struggle. Although the Government had imported Pathans to carry out attachment orders, it could find few buyers for either lands or cattle. Patel had infused such a spirit of unity among the peasants that the non-violent non-co-operation was not only a great success, but became a model for future campaigns.

At last the Government had to agree to a settlement. The spirit shown by the peasants drew praise even from those who strongly disapproved of the Gandhian way of warfare. Annie Besant, one of them, was moved to declare: "Let us Bardolise the country." In fact, Bardoli paved the way for Gandhi's later victories. And Patel, the hero of Bardoli, rightly earned for himself the title of "Sardar" from his master.


As chairman of the Congress Parliamentary Board in the 'thirties, Patel proved himself to be the "Iron Man" by building a powerful parliamentary machine, which captured power in 1937 in eight out of eleven provinces; in that capacity he was a virtual Minister-maker. His success as a party leader was mainly due to his being both dictatorial and ruthless, sparing neither friends or foes. But he soared much higher as a tactician when he solved the highly complex and baffling problem of the 560 odd Princely States after independence. It was a bloodless revolution, an achievement far greater than Bismarck's in the 19th century. Like Bismarck, Patel was a man of the soil—bold, courageous and unwavering, but unlike him he was a Gandhian and had none of the aggressive trappings of the Iron Chancellor—"a fierce moustache, huge jack boots, a spiked helmet and a sword." And yet he succeeded in persuading the Princes to consider the larger interests of the country and make a voluntary sacrifice. That the unification and democratisation of the States took less than two years and preceded the framing of the new constitution was in itself a great feat. It enabled the States to become equal participants in the Republic on January 26, 1950.

That Patel concealed behind his soldier-like, hard and ruthless exterior, kindness and warmth and a deep sense of subtle humour, was revealed when he and Gandhi were thrown together in Yeravda Jail in 1932. Gandhi, in fact, rediscovered his Sardar when he wrote later: "I was well aware of his matchless bravery and his burning love of the country, but I had never lived with him as I have had the good fortune to do during the 16 months. The affection with which he covered me recalls to me that of my own dear mother. I never knew him to possess motherly qualities." Although, as Gandhi himself said once, there was no spiritual kinship between the two, Patel looked after Gandhi's comforts with the devotion of a *chela*.

Lord Mountbatten has handsomely testified to Patel's great qualities of heart. Before he went out to India in 1947, he was told as a warning that he would find in Patel "a tough guy." On the contrary, Lord Mountbatten discovered behind the Sardar's outwardly cold and rough exterior "a very warm heart beating." Yet, the warning was not altogether inapt. If the British found in Gandhi the ever-forgiving Mahatma and in Nehru something of an idealist tethered to practical politics, in Patel they encountered a hard rock—seldom yielding when principles were involved. Moreover, they knew, as someone has remarked, "he was carrying in him a volcano capable of shaking the British Empire to its very foundations."

Many years ago Sarojini Naidu described Patel as "a volcano covered with snow." True to that description, the Sardar was always calm and unruffled, emitting no smoke and ashes, however grave the crisis. But for full three years after independence he bestrode the land like a colossus while lesser men anxiously watched his frowns and smiles.

LONDON NOTEBOOK



Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, at his press conference during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London. He disclosed on that occasion that there had been no settlement of the Kashmir dispute with India. Three proposals, put forward by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers for the policing of Kashmir during a plebiscite had been accepted by him but had been rejected by Pandit Nehru. Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan expressed his deep concern about the conflict, the solution of which, he said, was vital for the maintenance of peace not only between the two dominions, but for the world. He hoped that the U.N. Security Council would take quick and effective steps to make a plebiscite possible.

PLEA FOR KASHMIR SOVEREIGNTY


Sir Godfrey Davis, the former Chief Judge of the Sind High Court, addressed a joint meeting of the East India Association and the Over-Seas League on January 9, advocating a new solution to the Kashmir problem. He said that Kashmir in her long history which reaches back into the legendary past, has had both Hindu and Moslem connections. Hindu kings reigned almost to the end of the 13th century when, about 1294, the last of them was put to death by his Muhammedan Wazir who ascended to the throne. From then onwards until

Kashmir's incorporation in the dominion of Akbar in 1588, the state was ruled by Muhammedan kings. Sir Godfrey then outlined the subsequent history of Kashmir until October, 1947, when Maharaja Sir Hari Singh executed the instrument of accession to the Indian Union, the validity of which is being disputed by the Government of Pakistan. After tracing the many attempts made by the Security Council and the U.N. Commission—which at least succeeded in achieving a cease fire—to settle the conflict, and after explaining the difficulties encountered by Sir Owen Dixon, Sir Godfrey put forward the following proposal: he suggested that Kashmir, with the blessing and the active help and encouragement of her two great neighbours, should be allowed to proclaim for herself a sovereign status. This should not apply, in Kashmir's own interest, to foreign relations and defence, which should be the final responsibility of India and Pakistan, under the aegis of the United Nations, bound each in treaty to Kashmir and to each other. As it is apparently not possible to hold a fair plebiscite, no plebiscite should be held at all, and the old boundaries should remain. The present government of Sheikh Abdulla



The Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mr. D. S. Senanayake, at a great reception given in his honour by Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, the High Commissioner for Ceylon, in London.

should be regarded as the nucleus of a provisional government which, with the mutual consent and support of India and Pakistan, could be gradually enlarged in its constitution, in its territories and its jurisdictions to cover what was, before 1947, the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Sir Godfrey was satisfied that Sheikh Abdulla's record made it clear that he was not likely to be the creator of sectional or communal interests.



Sir Benegal Rau, India's permanent delegate to U.N. and a prominent advocate of the Korean "cease fire" proposal, during his recent visit to London where he had talks with Prime Minister Nehru.

THAI SCIENTIST

Dr. Chaloom Puranananda, Secretary of the Thai Medical Research Council and Director of the Pasteur Institute, Bangkok, who has been touring Western Europe, spent three weeks in the United Kingdom in January under the auspices of the British Council. He visited medical research institutions and studied recent British developments in electron microscopy.

FILMS OF TIBET

The Royal India, Pakistan and Ceylon Society last month arranged a show of Sir Basil Gould's remarkable colour films of Tibet. The effect of the views was heightened by the explanation of Sir Basil, who threw a valuable light on that "mysterious" land which has recently come into the headlines.

KOREAN POTTERY


by *M. Kerslake*

ALTHOUGH usually overshadowed by the elegance and perfection of its Chinese counterpart, Korean pottery nevertheless at times reached such admirable peaks of development that even the Chinese themselves were forced to admit, for instance, that the "sky colour" of Korean ware of the Korai period was unsurpassed and impossible to imitate.

The pottery industry flourished in Korea for many centuries, as can be seen by the many potsherds which have been collected, some of them dating from neolithic times. The geographical position of Korea made it inevitable that a close contact with China was maintained and that the Koreans should come under the influence of Chinese culture. The extent of this influence is not known, but Chinese graves of the Han period excavated in Korea show that the Koreans were in close touch with Chinese art.

Korean pottery of the earliest times developed along individual lines, although it is possible that by then the essentials had already been learned from the Chinese. Pottery of the Silla period, approximately from the 1st-10th century, is mostly hard ware, slate grey in colour and unglazed. The only ornamentation is usually large perforations, somewhat clumsy reliefs and elementary patterns scratched on the surface. This is the preponderant type to be found in tombs of this period. However, one variety shows more elegance in the potting and finish, being thinner and fired hard and generally more ornamental.

The zenith of Korean pottery making was reached during the Korai period, when Korean potters produced superb examples of celadon ware. This development is usually presumed to be due either to a sudden influx of Chinese refugees or to those Koreans who had gone to China to study. The finest Korai ware to be produced was the blue-green celadon which was made in the period between 1050 and 1170. Examples of this were much praised at Kublai Khan's court and in Japan where



they were in demand for use during the tea ceremony. The wares of this period show a dignity and restraint together with a feeling for form and proportion—qualities which were later to be lost. They are either plain or delicately enlivened with incised or carved designs, and the glaze varies, sometimes being a true green, resembling the Chinese celadon of Lung Ch'uan. Indeed, some examples can hardly be distinguished from Chinese ware, the only difference being that in Korean specimens the footring is generally glazed and practically always marked by the spurs or sand used to support the piece whilst it was being fired. This rough finish is rather surprising, when one considers the amount of technical skill which had been acquired by the Korean potters by that time. Another imperfection in Korean ware is the asymmetrical shapes it sometimes takes. Whether this is due to faulty firing or whether, as many experts believe, to the whim of the individual potter who liked to enliven his work with a twist here and there, has not been proved. If, as it has been supposed, the Korean craftsmen were so strongly influenced by their Chinese teachers, then it is certain that vessels of imperfect shape would hardly have survived until today in

such quantities—unless the imperfections were deliberate and individual—an attempt by the potter to assert his own ideas.

During the Korai period, a typical Korean form of decoration was introduced. This was the inlaying of celadon with white and black clays. When done with care and taste the effect was charming, and was often used to decorate small objects such as cosmetic pots. Unfortunately, this style deteriorated and the designs lost their individuality, being merely stamped on the clay instead of being drawn first with a stylus, resulting in a meaningless ornamentation.

Other forms of decoration were developed during the Korai era, including underglaze painting in heavy designs in brown in the manner of the Chinese Tzu Chu ware, while experiments were made with coloured clays, blending them to give a marbled effect. However, by the end of the 13th century, the craftsmanship which had produced the masterpieces of celadon had become decadent. The potting had lost much of its former delicacy and the unique celadon blue and green glazes had given way to a dull brown shade. This gradual decay signified the end of the era of Korea's prosperity, for after the invasion of the country by Japan at the end of the 16th century, she became a closed king-



dom. Pottery produced during this era, which lasted until 1910, is relatively rare, and as far as can be ascertained from Japanese imitations, it comprised a heavy red or grey pottery, with a transparent glaze which varied from light grey to brown, a lighter and more delicate ware of a creamy shade with a closely crackled glaze and a grey ware with a heavy white glaze.

Three examples of Korai ware—

(left) Jar and stand

(above) Ritual wine ewer with hinged cover over spout.

The glaze is a lustrous grey, with a scattered crackle. The design is inlaid in white and black, a good example of Korai unkaku (clouds and storks)

(opposite page) Wine pot, incorporating a traditional double-gourd form with a twisted handle. The glaze is a brilliant grey-green with a crackled surface

(By courtesy of the Freer Gallery of Art)

FROM ALL QUARTERS

Chiang Kai-shek's Five Year Plan

In analysing the present world situation and outlining possible future developments at a memorial service held in Taipei recently, Gen. Chiang Kai-shek declared that he had already mapped out a plan for the attack on the Chinese mainland. According to this plan, preparations would be made during the first year, a counter-offensive launched in the second year, a campaign of exterminating and suppressing the Communists would be started in the third, and final success achieved in the fifth year. The Military Information Service of the Nationalist Defence Ministry claim that its guerilla forces on the mainland now number 3,000,000 men.

Water Conservancy in China

In North-East Ahnwei, over 230,000 peasants are working on the Sui River, one of the largest tributaries of the Huai River. Along 134 km. of the Sui they are dredging silted sections, erecting new dykes and cutting a new river bed through mountain gorges. This will protect more than 333,000 hectares of wheat land against floods this spring. Owing to serious silting, the middle and lower sections of the Sui were choked and this caused severe floods. More than a quarter of the dredging work on the most important section of the Huai River in North Ahnwei has been completed by civilian workers, who used powerful dredgers to remove nearly 500,000 tons of silt. In Hopei, dyke repairs are already completed along the Yungting, Chaopai and Chiyun Rivers and their tributaries. The reinforcement of dykes along 70 km. of the Yungting River should, it is estimated, contain the flood waters in the spring. Yellow River control work began in December, and some 15,000 civilian labourers are taking part, their "working fervour" being encouraged by emulation contests. The programme for 1951 envisages a flood prevention scheme to cope with a rise to the highest level reached during the 1949 floods. In the middle and upper reaches a reservoir will be constructed, surveying and inspection work will be expanded and the plan for leading the Yellow River into the Chi and Wei Rivers will be continued. In Shantung, the fourth stage of the Shu River project has been completed. New dyke systems and a series of great dams have been built at intervals along 140 km. of the river, while the new river bed in the 14 km. long section of a mountain gorge through which the Shu River would be directed to the sea via the outlet of another river, has been widened and deepened.

Anti-Malaria Campaign in Thailand

In a district of northern Thailand where 50 out of every 1,000 persons had malaria in 1949, the number of cases has fallen to only 7 per 1,000 following malaria control operations conducted with the aid of the World Health Organisation and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, according to a report made by Dr. G. Sambasivan, an Indian malariologist leading an international team established in 1949 in the Sarapee district of Chiangmai, Thailand, jointly by the Thai Government, WHO and UNICEF. In the adjacent Hang-Dong district, a Thai team was established at the same time to operate on the same lines as the international team. Together the two

teams have given anti-malarial protection to a total population of 66,000 by indoor spraying of DDT.

The success of the first year's operations has led the Government of Thailand to plan for 1951 an expanded anti-malaria campaign among a population of 300,000 in the Chiangmai and Lampoon Provinces. WHO and UNICEF have been asked to continue their aid in expanding the work of the international team to cover a population of 175,000 this year.

Memorial to Atom Pioneer

Ten leading Indian scientists have issued an appeal for donations to the Memorial Fund proposed to be created in memory of the eminent scientist the late Lord Rutherford of Nelson.

Signatories to the appeal are Dr. C. V. Raman, Dr. M. N. Saha, Dr. H. J. Bhabha, Dr. K. S. Krishnan, Dr. S. N. Bose, Dr. B. M. Bose, Dr. R. S. Krishnan, Dr. S. Bhagwantam, Dr. S. K. Mitra and Dr. S. S. Bhatnagar.

Sponsored by the Royal Society, the London fund will be used to finance scholarships for post-graduate students for research in natural sciences.

Burmese Rebels Surrender

In his Independence Day speech, the President of Burma said that by January 4 over 7,800 rebels had surrendered. Rebels still active were estimated at not less than 8,000, but the number who had handed in their arms was greater than expected. The President also pointed out that Burma's trade showed upward trends, since exports of rice, bran and broken rice in 1950 exceeded the 1949 exports by 38 per cent, and forest revenue in 1950 exceeded that of 1949 by 66 per cent.

Archaeological Find Near Karachi

Relics of possibly the earliest Muslim settlement on the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent—a town of the eighth century—have been found on an ancient mound 35 miles north-east of Karachi. This derelict site, which is about three to four miles south-east of Dabheji railway station on the North-Western Railway, and locally known as Bhanbore, is expected to throw light on the mystery regarding the earliest settlements of Arabs on the sub-continent. It is believed to be Daibul, a city which overlooked the spot where Mohammad Quasim, first conqueror of Sind, landed. It had not been possible until now to determine the exact location of this city, one of the many subdued by the Arabs in the course of their triumphal march across the sub-continent.

After learning of an interesting and ancient mound near Dabheji, the Director of Archaeology visited the site on January 7. He found it strewn with potsherds of various descriptions, both glazed and plain. Closer observation revealed traces of buildings. The Director collected fragmentary specimens of household objects including fragments of hand-made saucers, jars, glassware, shell objects, personal ornaments and terracotta sherds bearing glazes in cobalt blue, white and buff. The most interesting find was a couple of tiny copper coins bearing Arabic legends inscribed in Kufic characters. The fabric and calligraphy indicate that the currency was issued by or under the

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influence of some Arab Dynasty. After a preliminary examination of these coins, coupled with the exposed alignment of stone structures and surface collections, the Director's opinion is that the site is connected with the earliest Muslim occupation.

Indian Government to Ease Scientists' Language Difficulties

A board of scientists and philologists, whose task is to fix uniform scientific terms for all of India's languages, has been appointed by the Indian government as part of its programme of facilitating scientific research. The board will lay down principles for the incorporation of international scientific terms into India's many languages and will also decide on new terms wherever foreign words cannot be adapted into an Indian tongue. The government took this action to prevent the growth of varying scientific terminologies for each Indian language.

Geological Survey's Centenary

On January 10 the Geological Survey of India, one of the oldest official organisations of its kind in the world, celebrates its centenary. To commemorate the occasion, a Congress of Geologists attended by a number of foreign scientists, was held in Calcutta.

During its long history, this Department has made a notable contribution of the development of geological science. Its activities were closely connected with the growth of the mineral industry in India, and it was due to the preliminary work done by the Geological Survey that premier industrial organisations like Tata Iron and Steel and the Indian Copper Corporation were established.

The Department was founded in 1851 with the primary object of conducting investigations of the country's coal-fields. Subsequently survey work in respect of other important minerals was also undertaken. Early in the current century new deposits of minerals like manganese, chromite, iron ore and bauxite were located. Later the Survey also carried out geological investigations in the region of the Himalayas, Baluchistan, Tibet and Afghanistan.

In recent years the Geological Survey's activities have further expanded to include location of rare minerals, determination of depth of bed-rocks at dam sites in connection with river valley projects, investigation of reserves of low-grade coal for the manufacture of synthetic petroleum and the search for natural petroleum.

U.N.I.C.E.F. Aid for Filipinos

A remarkable improvement in the health of children in the Philippines, who are receiving aid through the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (U.N.I.C.E.F.), was reported by U.N.I.C.E.F. staff members who have served in this country since demonstration feeding programmes began about a year ago.

Studies conducted in Manila indicate that a daily supplementary meal, based on milk, meat and fish-liver oil provided by U.N.I.C.E.F. and on native foods, is having marked effect on some 2,000 school children who receive it.

In addition to demonstration feeding programmes in about 50 schools, similar demonstrations, reaching over 9,000 mothers and young children, are being conducted through a number of child centres. Milk and fish-liver oil are also being provided for 10,000 children in institutions and refugee camps.

MALAYAN QUESTIONS

A series of pamphlets edited by Dr E. H. G. Dobby, Professor of Geography, University of Malaya, written by residents of Malaya, and intended to provide a background of factual information to contemporary problems. Each pamphlet costs 1s. 6d. Three titles have been issued so far.

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Towards Freedom From Want by D. SPENCER HATCH
(Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, Rs. 8.8)

A Larger Way for Women by K. NORA BROCKWAY (Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, Rs. 4.8)
(Hind Kitabs, Rs. 4.8)

Universities and National Life by S. R. DONGERKERRY
(Hindu Kitabs Ltd., Rs. 4.8)

Towards Freedom from Want is a personal account of the highly successful technique tried out by the author for the purpose of initiating Rural Reconstruction in several parts of South India, especially at the Martandam Centre in Travancore State. Various schemes have been tried from time to time to help the Indian villager, but most of them have failed because the impetus came from without, and when it was withdrawn, the peasant gradually relapsed into his old habits. The central feature of Dr. Spencer Hatch's scheme is that it trains the villager to help himself. The essence of the plan is the training of leaders, taken from the people themselves and fully alive to their needs. The best teaching principles demand an appeal to the individual in terms of his native tendencies so as to release his energy to learning. If the instructor cannot release this energy, he cannot teach. The villager, though outcaste and illiterate, readily responds to advice which will result in greater income with which to purchase the necessities of life. Dr. Spencer Hatch's book is really a continuation of his two former works, *Up From Poverty* and *Further Upwards*, in which he expounds the principle of the "Martandam Five-Sided Triangle," Spiritual - Mental - Physical - Economic - Social. During the war, he had the opportunity of applying the same principles in Mexico, and found that well-tried, sound methods will serve anywhere, if skilfully and devotedly adapted to the culture, needs and wishes of those who dwell there.

In her *Larger Way for Women*, Miss Brockway gives a striking account of the efforts of Christian missionaries and their devoted wives to ameliorate the pitiful lot of Indian women, which had reached its lowest ebb in the beginning of the eighteenth century, when two German Protestants started the first girls' school at the Danish settlement of Trarquebar on the Madras coast. In 1752, Varperry, now in the heart of Madras city, became the leading centre for Christian education in Southern India, and the work was carried out regardless of the distractions caused by the wars against the French and Tipu Sultan. In 1835, a great impetus was provided by Lord Bentinck's decision to make English the language of higher education, and all over the country the desire of cultured parents for better educational facilities for their daughters became more vocal. The result was seen in the immense strides made in social reform. Suttee and infanticide were abolished, and in 1918, Dr. Ida Scudder, of the Arcot Mission, founded the first medical school for women at Vellore. Success seemed in sight when the Sarda Act of 1927 made the

FAR EAST

marriage of girls under fourteen and boys under eighteen illegal. The question is often asked whether there will be any place for Christian schools in the India of tomorrow. In the opinion of the writer they will be welcomed if they identify themselves with India's interests and if they have something of value to contribute. This is a well-documented and scholarly account of an important aspect of Indian Education.

In *Universities and National Life*, Mr. S. R. Dongerkerry, for many years Registrar of Bombay University, discusses with temperateness and lucidity the problems confronting the universities of India and Pakistan in the context of a democratic world, the limitations of state control, the dangers of over-specialisation at the expense of a liberal education, and the steps to be taken to ensure that learning may be placed within the reach of those unable to come to the universities.

H. G. RAWLINSON

Burma by D. G. E. HALL (*Hutchinson's University Library*, 7s. 6d.)

To ask that the history of a country's evolution, which has extended over at least fourteen hundred years, should be compressed within the space of 176 pages would seem to be asking for the impossible, or, if it should so happen in this case that the impossible proved realisable, for a history which was not worth the telling. Professor Hall, however, has shown that a condensed history can be written which is both scholarly and extremely readable.

In a history such as this, little space can be given to conjecture, and accordingly the period of the Pyu and Mon dynasties prior to the hegemony of the Pagan kingdom under Anawrahta (1044-1077) receives cursory treatment. Burmese history, proper, is assumed to begin with the reign of Anawrahta, and in tracing the varying fortunes of the three main dynasties—the Burmese with its capital at Ava, the Mon dynasty based on Pegu and the Toungoo dynasty—Professor Hall tells a story which consistently holds the reader's attention by its steady illumination of cause and effect, and which never permits itself the indulgence of merely cataloguing important names and dates.

For the ordinary western reader the chief interest of this book lies in its account of the impact of European politics and trade on a remote kingdom with completely alien traditions and habits of life, and although the dangers of partisanship are manifold in such an undertaking, the author has succeeded in giving us an account which is a model example of the way in which Imperial history ought to be written. The fortuitous ebb and flow in official British policy produced by the impulse of private trading concerns to secure fresh sources of raw materials, acting sometimes in conjunction with, and at other times in opposition to, the national need for preserving a balance of power in Europe, presents an example in miniature of the forces which made for the growth of the British Empire. No better illustration could be found of the way in which trade

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was used to serve the interests of government than in the use of Thomas Spears, a cotton piece-goods merchant, as unofficial ambassador to the court of Ava after the second Burmese war.

The latter part of this book is devoted to a brief but useful study of Burmese organisation under the kings and under British tutelage. The all pervading influence of Buddhism on the people's way of life gives a characteristic quality to Burmese history. It manifests itself in a variety of ways; at its best in a combination of pious zeal with refinement of culture which together restrained a monarch from lapsing into the excesses and cruelties which are normally associated with the exercise of despotic power. At all times there was a tendency on the part of the kings to neglect the practical needs of day-to-day government in their desire to accomplish works which would earn for them posthumous merit. In the lives of the majority of the people the influence of Buddhism is to be seen in the importance attached to the religious shrines and monasteries. That the yellow robe of the monk was sometimes used as a cover for nefarious activities cannot be disputed, but the British government, by refusing to confirm the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical commission which had operated under the kings, deprived itself of the only effective machinery for maintaining monastic discipline. It was unfortunate that the British administration, in this sphere above all others, should have failed to pursue its later policy of sacrificing, when expedient, the principles of Victorian liberalism to local laws and Burmese practices.

MICHAEL WHEELER

The New World of South-East Asia by LENNOX A. MILLS and ASSOCIATES (University of Minnesota Press, \$5.00)

Most historians tend to hold aloof from the contemporary scene, and few writers on post-war South-east Asia can lay claim to any serious historical study. In Professor Mills we have a shining exception. In his hands history serves what is perhaps its most important function in becoming a yardstick of contemporary affairs; and if his view of the future seems unduly pessimistic, it is anchored to a lifetime of dispassionate study. That a broad-based democracy as understood in the West will ever take root in South-east Asia he does not believe. Rather the government of these countries is likely to rest in the hands of Western-educated oligarchies. Where electoral machinery is set up he augurs better of indirect than of direct voting. In the "intellectual proletariat, the embittered army of political agitators", he discerns a potent danger. In an important section on "Foreign Capital" he points out that, on the scanty information available, tropical investment has been much less profitable than is generally supposed, and that while foreign investors are not opposed to political independence on principle, they demand reasonable profits, the maintenance of law and order, legal security, and stability.

The Stakes of Democracy in South-East Asia by H. J. VAN MOOK (Allen & Unwin, 15s.)

The courageous lead given by Dr. van Mook in 1945-8 to the cause of Indonesian emancipation won him many admirers in the English-speaking world and particularly in

this country. In the teeth of intense opposition from the government and people of the Netherlands he, as Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, met the rebel leader, now President Sukarno, in November 1945, negotiated with Sjahrir the "Inverchapel" Agreement of April 1946, and finally signed the Linggadajti (or Killearn) Agreement of November 1947. In each case these actions were instantly, flatly and publicly repudiated at The Hague but, notwithstanding incessant rumours of dismissal, Dr. van Mook held stubbornly to his conciliatory course. With Linggadajti ended the British Occupation. The Dutch military, headed by the late General Spoor, as thoroughgoing a Teuton in character as in appearance, then took the bit between their teeth and worked up a whirlwind campaign against violations of the Truce Agreement (which formed part of the Linggadajti Agreement) on the part of the Republicans, blithely disregarding the prior rejection by the Netherlands Government of the political undertakings which were an indispensable foundation for any effective truce. After six months of deadlock and recrimination in March, 1948, the Netherlands Government managed to bulldoze the Indonesian Republic into accepting for "ratification" the Linggadajti "Agreement" as re-written at The Hague. Vainly did Sjahrir protest that, by introducing unilateral amendments, the Dutch had torpedoed the Agreement. His Cabinet fell and, under American pressure, the Republic made yet further political concessions, though without averting the Police Action which Dr. van Mook launched on July 27. In *The Stakes of Democracy in South-East Asia* he declares that "what hurt the Dutch most was . . . the atmosphere of distrust they felt among their nearest allies, sometimes exploding into downright accusations of bad faith. . . . They were deeply shocked by the contention that they were profligate or insincere." In attributing the British outcry against the Police Action to Labour's doctrinal dislike of colonial rule *per se*, however, Dr. van Mook confounds its elements. To sign an agreement, tear it up, re-write it yourself and thrust this new version forcibly down the throat of the other party assails our whole conception of constitutional process; and tacitly to acquiesce in this being done, not by a mere Asian state new to the game, but by a fellow democracy, an intimate neighbour and a sister monarchy—and done to an agreement made under British sponsorship—would have been to recant the faith by which we live and to preclude ourselves from ever again raising the lantern of democracy in Asia or elsewhere. That there were in Indonesia, as in Burma, gangsters and Communists whose elimination was a *sine qua non* of any secure administration, Dutch or Indonesian, was not denied at the time and has been demonstrated since. Had such a police action been undertaken after the ratification of the van Mook-Sjahrir Agreement of 1946 and with Indonesian concurrence (which was "in the bag" at that time), or even after the ratification of Linggadajti in its original form, there would have been little or no adverse comment from this country. There remains the question—should Dr. van Mook have resigned rather than reverse a policy of which, for two and a half years, he had been the mainspring? The British observer, inevitably preoccupied with constitutional niceties, is apt to say "yes" regardless of the absence in the Netherlands of any tribunal where, had he chosen such a course, he and/or his supporters could effectively plead his cause. Dr. van Mook defends

his action on the ground that he was—and is—more of a civil servant than a politician, and that to have thrown in his hand when an unpopular job had to be done would have been the conduct of a coward. Hostile critics of the Left argue that to overthrow the Republic by force was all along his secret intention, and that his "conciliatory" period was merely a pose to fool the British. On that issue no verdict is possible without publication of all the despatches between The Hague and Batavia during his term of office. Their publication is indeed essential to any full understanding of this tangled story. If the chapters in

which Dr. van Mook tries to vindicate Dutch policy in Indonesia add little to our knowledge on that subject, the prescient part is that devoted to an unmatched analysis of nationalist psychology and a penetrating appraisal of the general situation in South-East Asia as a whole. It is predominantly a forward-looking book, written in an easy, yet authoritative vein, which is an indispensable companion to "The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia" (H.M.S.O. Cmd. 8080).

B. WHITTINGHAM-JONES

THE GREAT MAHATMA

by S. Bhattacharya

Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas by C. F. ANDREWS, with an Introduction by H. C. ALEXANDER (George Allen and Unwin, 12s 6d.)

The publishers deserve special congratulations for bringing out at this juncture, when the world is suffering from war-phobia, the third impression of Mr. Andrews' celebrated work, "Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas," including selections from his writings. Mr. Andrews died in 1940 while the Mahatma continued to achieve his mission for several more years. Thus there were two courses open to the publishers to make the work up-to-date: either to revise the work with necessary supplementation or to leave the main work untouched and to supplement it with an illuminating introduction by someone who had watched the Mahatma in close quarters in order to enable the writer to communicate the same atmosphere which Mr. Andrews did. The publishers very wisely chose the latter course for it is scarcely possible to find someone with Mr. Andrews' equipment, the close intimacy, the warmth, the genuineness yet unemotional and objective approach to the subject, and a less equipped writer is bound to mar the insuperable quality of the work and can at best make a poor show of a patchwork.

The work has been reviewed in EASTERN WORLD before. Yet no special apology is needed for doing the same once again, since the message of Mahatma Gandhi is more than ever in need of being re-stated when the world is frantically struggling to discover an alternative to a third World War.

Mahatma Gandhi was born at Porbunder, a small seaport on the coast of Kathiawar, West India. Being the son of a hereditary Prime Minister of the State, and also in response to the fashion of the time, he came to England to qualify as a barrister-at-law and returned to India to join the Bar in Bombay and Kathiawar. His life might have ended as a successful lawyer but for the fact that he was called upon by a Moslem client to conduct a case for him in South Africa. His public life first began there in 1893 when he writes: "I discovered that I had no rights as a man because I was an Indian." But till 1920 he was a loyal supporter of the British Constitution for he thought all this time that this unpleasant state of humiliation for being born an Indian was just a travesty of the justice and honesty of the British Government. So in the Boer War and also during the Zulu Revolt in 1906, he raised volunteer ambulance corps in support of the Government. In 1914, during the first world war, he did the same and, what is more, in response to the appeal at the war conference in Delhi in 1918, he helped the Government in its recruiting project in Khaira at the risk of some violent criticism against what was considered to be a deviation from his pacifist policy. Further, he fought for co-operation

at the Amritsar Congress in 1919 for the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. But the Rowlatt Act, which robbed the people of their freedom, was a severe blow to his faith and loyalty. Then the Punjab horrors beginning with the Jallianwala Bagh massacre and culminating in crawling orders, public floggings and other indescribable humiliations coupled with the breach of the Khilafat promise convinced him that "the Government established by law in British India is carried on for . . . exploitation of the masses." So in 1920 he launched a non-operation Movement against the Government, for which he was jailed for "promoting disaffection towards the Government established by law in India." On his release in 1924 he found the country torn by Hindu-

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Moslem riots. Taking this as a result of his leadership he underwent the self-purificatory vow of fasting for 21 days and afterwards, acknowledging his failure, relinquished politics. But the forces released under his leadership dragged him into it in 1928 and once again he started another non-co-operation movement in 1930 with the violation of the Salt Tax Law. The same year marks the starting point of his Wardha scheme of education. The movement came to an abrupt end with the Gandhi-Irwin Pact of 1931, followed by the MacDonald Award in 1932. In the meantime the Wardha scheme, with its emphasis on handicrafts, continued to take shape. In spite of frustrations, Mahatma Gandhi still believed in the inherent justice and honesty of the British Government and so in 1939, when the second world war broke out, he was ready to offer moral support to the Government. But in fact the alienation of the Congress from the Government was complete when in 1942 Civil Disobedience was launched. Mahatma Gandhi was arrested with his wife, who died in internment. He made another fast of 21 days and was released in 1944 on the grounds of ill-health. After his release he tried in vain to come to terms with Mr. Jinnah, the head of the Moslem League, to dissuade him from pressing the claim for a separate Moslem State—Pakistan. In 1945 Labour came to power in Great Britain and expressed its unequivocal intention to transfer power to India—but to whom? The country was then plunged into a series of riots and massacres. Gandhiji went from one part of India to another to try and settle fratricidal strife—from Calcutta to Noakhali, from Noakhali to Bihar, from Bihar to the N.W.F. Province. In Bengal he made a pact with Surawardi, the premier of Bengal, in 1947. But all this could not prevent the shattering of his long-cherished ideal—Hindu-Moslem unity for which he worked so long and so arduously. The power was transferred to a divided India—India and Pakistan—on August 15, 1947. The division entailed violent massacres in the Punjab and Eastern Pakistan and retaliation at Delhi and other places. This was too much for a pacifist leader like Gandhiji, and he made another fast for redressing the grievances of the Moslem population in India. He achieved his end, but at the cost of his own life. A section of disgruntled extremists rose against him and at 5.5 p.m. on January 30, 1948, he was assassinated.

The fundamental outlook of Mahatma Gandhi was

religious. It coloured his actions, politics, morals, commerce and economics, in fact, all that has to do with conscience. It was liberal Hinduism reconciled to and enriched by Islam and Christianity. He imbibed his mother's religious belief, asceticism and simplicity. The sea in the vicinity of his birth-place, with its ever-unfolding mystery, contributed to his mystic temperament. The Arabian desert, tempered and softened by sea, instilled in him the teachings of Islam specially embodied in Sufism. Islam taught him faith and action, tender love and suffering, bare simplicity and chivalrous devotion to the poor and a happy blending of political and spiritual reinforced by the irresistible might of meekness. Tolstoy awakened in him a burning desire for Christianity, and the Sermon on the Mount thrilled his devout heart. In fact he was profoundly impressed by the inner truth of the Christian message in its moral aspect. The idea of non-violent non-co-operation or passive resistance, the unique weapon used in politics, is said to have emerged from his reading of the New Testament, as was the idea of conversion which meant for him "a life of greater dedication to one's own country, greater surrender to God, greater self-purification."

But he took the spirit of other religions and rejected their parochialism. "Although I admire much in Christianity," he says, "I am unable to identify myself with orthodox Christianity." To him religion was an act of faith and its triumph was in one heart appealing directly to another heart. He therefore regrets that "Christian missionaries came to India under the shadow, or, if you like it, under the protection of a temporal power, and it creates an impassable barrier." He caught the spirit of Christianity and Islam, yet remained all along a mother's son, a Sanatani, an orthodox Hindu. "I must tell you in all humility," he writes, "that Hinduism as I know it entirely satisfies my soul, fills my whole being, and I find a solace in the *Bhagavad Gita* and the *Upanishads* that I miss even in the Sermon on the Mount. . . My life has been full of external tragedies, and if they have not left any visible and indelible effect on me, I owe it to the teachings of the *Bhagavad Gita*. . . . On examination I have found it to be the most tolerant of all religions known to me, because it gives the largest scope of self-expression."

(To be continued)

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Sir,—In your December 1950 issue, the article entitled "The Rise of Hindu Nationalism," by Mr. Panchanan Misra, appears to contain many inaccurate statements which should be corrected.

Mr. Misra finds fault with the Moslem League for treating the Indian National Congress as a Hindu organisation. The Congress membership is predominantly Hindu though there is a small percentage of Moslems, Christians and Parsis. The minorities in the Congress Organisation never influenced the major decisions. It was this fact of its composition that led Mr. Jinnah, the President of the Moslem League, Sir Stafford Cripps and the Cabinet Mission to treat the Congress as a Hindu organisation. In reality, it is a Hindu organisation in composition, though the leaders want to claim for it a secular character.

The Congress leaders sacrificed the interests of the Hindus in their desire to be regarded as secularists, men of sweet reasonableness, statesmen and practical men of affairs, and the result was the Partition of India, which led to so much massacre and pillage to which Mr. Misra refers, since the Hindu masses were dissatisfied when they found that their leaders had let them down.

Mr. Misra seems to lay the assassination of Gandhi at the

doors of Communalism, and particularly the R.S.S. The assassination was the work of a few misguided youths, and the R.S.S. had nothing to do with it. The evidence at the trial disclosed nothing to incriminate the R.S.S. Yet two years after the close of the trial, Mr. Misra implies that he wants his readers to believe that the R.S.S. was involved. Mr. V. D. Savarkar, the former President of the Hindu Mahasabha, was acquitted by the Trial Judge, while the other offenders were sentenced to death and terms of imprisonment. Mr. Misra conveniently omits one sordid fact that came to light during the trial, namely, that the Government of India did not protect, by effective preventive action, the life of their Mahatma, though a Minister of the Bombay Government and top ranking Police Officers had definite information about a conspiracy to murder Gandhi.

As for Mr. Misra's remarks regarding the loyalty of the bureaucracy and the armed forces, they are not founded on facts. Both services are absolutely loyal to the present Government of India, and they were loyal to the then British Emperor. To suspect them of being capable of staging a *coup d'état* and of joining reactionary or revolutionary forces is an insult; the civil services and the armed forces are carrying on their duties under the present régime with the same devotion as they did in the past.

Yours, etc.,

Bangalore, India.

U. V. SEETARAMAIA, B.A., B.L.

REVIEW OF REVIEWS

THE consequences of the "World Crisis in Korea" are analysed by Prof. G. W. Keeton in the January issue of *World Affairs*. The result of the Chinese intervention "was to place upon the U.N. the disagreeable choice between accepting this challenge at its face value; i.e., as the occasion for a general war with China, or to negotiate under most unfavourable conditions. To accept the challenge of a general war would be to embark upon operations of unpredictable length under the most disadvantageous conditions with the certain knowledge that Communist China would receive steadily-increasing aid from the Soviet Union."

Mr. J. Frankel is an Australian who deals in the same issue with "The Background in French Indo-China." He comes to some queer conclusions, as for instance that "Bao Dai himself does not seem to be solidly aligned against the Viet Minh. The fact that he has been able to maintain personal safety despite the ample opportunities for a terrorist attack cannot but point to the explanation that the Viet Minh is not really hostile to him. Is there a possibility of Bao deserting the French and supporting the Viet Minh, especially if the latter can boast of some military successes?" To which once can only say that Bao Dai is heavily guarded and if he deserts the French in Indo-China, it will be only to look for safety in France. And as to Mr. Frankel's doubts about "how far Ho Chi-minh is prepared to accept a position of virtual dependence on China," Ho accepted it at the very moment he sent his troops to China for training.

One of the best articles in this rich issue of *World Affairs* is "Malaya Today," by the American professor, Lennox A. Mills. His thorough examination of historical and psychological facts, e.g., the three different nationalisms of Indians, Chinese and Malays in Malaya, of which only the last-named are actively engaged on the British side, comes to the conclusion that the situation will become infinitely worse if the Communists gain control of French Indo-China, Siam and Burma. And even if the Communist danger is averted "the risk is not fanciful that Malaya might become another Palestine." This may be an exaggeration, but it is certainly true that "if Nehru's advice were taken—that Britain could solve the Malayan problem by leaving the country—the result would be massacre and racial war."

Prof. Claude A. Buss, of Stanford University (California), analyses in the same issue "The Philippines in World Politics." There are some useful observations in his article, e.g., the assertion of President Quirino that "there is no organised movement of any consequence that can be considered as a threat to the stability of our government" (January, 1950), to which the professor replies: "But since that time the raids of the Hukbalahaps brought them to the very outskirts of Manila . . . and the breakdown of law and order has reached the point where it calls for drastic measures." After having read the article one realises that whatever moves the Filipinos make on the chess-board of international politics, they cannot carry any conviction as long as they have not put their own house in order.

A well-written survey of "Handicrafts and Small-Scale Industries in Asian Countries" and the possibilities of their co-operative organisation is to be found in the December issue of the *International Labour Review*. Related problems—the co-operative marketing of vegetables in Hong Kong—are dealt with by Mr. Robert Hart in *Corona* (January, 1951).

In *The Fortnightly* of January, 1951, Mr. Cecil Northcott examines "Christian Prospects in East Asia." His is a gloomy picture, but even the one he gives seems over-optimistic. Some interesting "Etudes Vietnamiennes" are published by *France-Asie* (No. 54) where we find also an article on "Le Roman Chinois," by La-Hoai.

Asia'sche Studien contains an interesting article on John of Mandeville and his disputed sojourn in Egypt (by Robert Fazy), and a very good explanation of the colour canon in lamaist painting (by Siegbert Hummel).

Of more than ephemeral importance are three articles on India, her foreign policy and her administrative system in *Politique Etrangère* (December, 1950) and the surveys in *The Eastern Economist* (December, 1950) of New Delhi, whereas the special India number of *United Asia* explores some new fields though in regrettably short feature articles. There is much more substance in the *India Quarterly* (Vol. V, No. 3), especially in the article written by H. Venkatasubbiah (on "Prospects of an Asian Union") and S. P. Chabiani (on "The Economic Possibilities of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands").

Reasons of space do not allow me to quote more than the titles of the excellent articles "Yalu River or Rubicon?" by Harold R. Isaacs and "The Philippines: Liberty and Licence" by D. L. Flamand, both in the New York fortnightly *The Reporter*.

Finally, I should like to draw attention to *Sud-Est Asiatique*, a monthly published in French in Saigon. It contains a wealth of profusely illustrated well-informed articles not only on Indo-China but also on other countries of the Far East and South-East Asia.

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India's Population by S. CHANDRASEKHAR (Rs. 7s.)

A lot of field work will have to be done by the officials who in February, 1951, are going to count India's population to provide the necessary data for demographic evaluation. In a country the size of a sub-continent with a high percentage of illiteracy among her approximately 320 million inhabitants, a demographer's work is far from easy, and if statistics are scanty, irregular and lack uniformity and one has to rely upon estimates rather than figures, it is well-nigh unbelievable that somebody should have had the courage to attempt the writing of a population study.

The job was the more thankless because the forced migrations of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan into India and of Moslems in the opposite direction have blurred even the incomplete picture that existed before 1947. Add to this the uncertainty about Kashmir and the French and Portuguese "colonies" in India, and it takes an expert of Dr. Sripati Chandrasekhar's rank—until 1949 he was in charge of demographic research in UNESCO—to undertake such a Herculean task.

Professor Chandrasekhar does not hide the fact that for want of reliable data he had to omit the age-composition of India's population from his demographic analysis. But though this and other admitted omissions are regrettable, the second edition of this book is proof of its pioneer value. The census now being prepared will, let us hope, provide the data for a revised third edition.

JOSEPH KALMER

TYPHOON TERROR

by James E. Carver

TYPHOONS occur in the Pacific towards the end of summer, when owing to the enormous heat, the air rises and swirls upwards in a vortex of ever-increasing violence. They originate around the Philippines and then move towards the coast of China and Japan, August and September being the worst months, although typhoons often occur up to almost the end of the year.

Guam, American Pacific headquarters, received a terrific beating during the typhoon season preceding the Pacific war. The wind, which attained a force of some two miles a minute, unroofed many buildings as if they had been covered with paper, but the worst harm was done by the torrential rain. The Pan-American Airways Hotel was wrecked, and the Marine barracks, hospital, radio station, and plane hangars were severely damaged.

Rain does not necessarily accompany a typhoon, but when it does there is no mistake about it. Baguio, the summer capital of the Philippines, experienced one of the most torrential typhoon rainfalls in meteorological history in 1937. It poured 110½ inches of rain—equal to four times the annual fall in Eastern England—on the city in a week. The wind careered through the surrounding mountains at 130 m.p.h., smashing houses and uprooting trees by the thousand. The terrified populace crouched indoors, with steel storm-shutters fastened tightly over their windows, their houses shaking like packs of cards, while outside timbers, corrugated iron and debris were thrown about like cards.

In Japan in 1940 a typhoon playfully took hold of a railway carriage and blew it 20 miles down the line from its siding. That, however, was merely a mischievous freak. In a totally different category was the typhoon which hit that country in 1934. Earthquakes and typhoons have been the cause of some of the most tragic events in Japanese history, and this particular storm struck the mainland at over two miles a minute. It stripped and flooded farms, killed 3,000 people and injured 9,000 others, wrecked 8,000 steamers and sailing craft, hurled trains over bridges, destroyed 290 schools and inundated 105,000 homes. The monetary loss was estimated at £60,000,000.

Hong Kong lies on the typhoon track and is devastated from time to time. In the harbour are specially designed buoys, which in popular opinion are reckoned "to hold a battleship in a 150 m.p.h. wind." Each has a huge reinforced concrete block attached by a cable, and each link is of steel two inches in diameter. Despite these, many ships on receiving a typhoon warning, signalled in the harbour by the firing of a gun, prefer to attempt to ride it out at sea.

But the most terrible experience of typhoons in Hong



Typhoon damage in Shanghai

Kong's history was in September, 1906, when in the space of two hours there were sunk or seriously damaged in and near the harbour, 67 European vessels, 652 Chinese junks, 54 lighters, 70 steam launches, and innumerable sampans. The loss of life was heavy. To guard against the enormous power of such winds the houses on the Peak, the chief residential quarter of the Colony, are built with special curtain walls. The trouble is that as a rule typhoons set up gigantic tidal waves, which result in more deaths than the devastation caused by the wind itself. This has happened more than once in the Hong Kong area, whole fishing fleets being wiped out, and the sudden rush of water inundating the unfortunate populations of coastal villages.

In times past there was no means of forecasting the approach of a typhoon, but the Japanese Government, among others in the Orient, has now established an elaborate system of warnings. There are scientific observatories at strategic points, whose task it is to keep track of the typhoons. Reports received from various parts of the China Seas enable the meteorologists to map the course of the typhoon. These storms generally follow a curving track, but this is not always so, for sometimes without warning they will recourse on an S-shaped course. The Japanese have a system whereby the first warning tells the people that there is a typhoon moving somewhere in the Pacific; the second means that it is heading for the mainland; the third urgently warns the people that it is imminent and that everyone should take cover.

Apart from official observatories, the Jesuit Fathers have done a priceless work with regard to typhoons. Today their signal stations are found all over the Oriental typhoon area. In Manila Father Albus has done wonderful experimental work on typhoons at the observatory there. Similarly, the name of Father Froc, who died in Paris at the age of 73 about a dozen years back, is associated with his great work at the observatory of Zi-Ka-Wei, close to Shanghai, and it is held in high honour all over the Far East.

Father Froc was born at Brest, and sailed for China as a missionary at the age of 24. At Zi-Ka-Wei (or Siccawei), where he was sent to work, he almost blundered

into his destiny. There was a small meteorological station at this place, and Father Froc became the head of the observatory which is now the largest of its kind in the world.

Fame did not trouble him. He became aware of the ghastly yearly loss of life on land and sea due to the havoc of typhoons, and he determined to give his own life to

the study of them. Gradually he built up connections, and in the end was daily receiving reports from all over the threatened areas. He drew up charts, and was able to forewarn mariners and peasants of the coming of over a thousand of these destructive manifestations of Nature's titanic powers, and was thus instrumental in saving countless possible victims.

ON THE BANKS OF THE GANGES

by R. H. Ferry

AS the sun sank fast in the west I sat on a flight of steps on the banks of the holy river—everywhere there were steps, terraces, and more steps leading down to the pewter grey water below which flowed smoothly and placidly in the evening hour of prayer. These steps had been hollowed by the tread of millions of pilgrims through ages measured only by the rising and setting of the sun.

It was fast growing dark and I could see only the silhouette of a small temple etched against the lighter grey of the sky beyond. For coolness the door was thrown wide open revealing a bull carved in white stone before a flowered altar of golden marigolds. This bend in the river was particularly revered, for all around on the terraces were temples throwing a fine filigree pattern of shadows.

As I set gazing westwards at where the sun had left a splash of oriental colour in the sky, flocks of homing pigeons flew back to their temple roosts. Each flight made a soft hush in the air as it passed over, and a subtle fluttering as the birds settled among the little domes.

Then suddenly I realised I was not alone.

An old man sat beside me. From a shaft of light thrown by a boat passing close in shore I saw that he was very old. The wrinkles on his face had been ironed out and the skin stretched tightly over his cheek-bones, giving him a look of second childhood. As he too gazed up the river I was struck by the smile on his face, it held something of the wisdom seen in the eyes of a newly-born babe or fledgling quail—there was happiness there, almost an ecstasy.

"You are a pilgrim?" I asked.

"I come from not far, the other side the river," he replied simply.

He took it for granted that I knew of the superstition that to die on the far bank might well be to return as an ass in the re-incarnation.

I did not question him further. This was no hour for words, but for dreams.

A silver sickle of a moon appeared above the roofs of the temples. The river became spread with a pall of enveloping mist only revealed by a strange radiance which emanated from the banks in a soft glow.

In the west the rays left by the sun still lingered, but in the darkened east the flames from a burning-ghat stabbed upwards—a fire of death yet as a living spirit released from

the shadows, colourful and vivid. More fires sprang up till they formed an arc round the river bend stretching from east to west. Each beacon flared in the first glory of kindling, died down, and came again in a steadier and warmer glow till the light of the sunset gave way.

Somewhere below a drum throbbed out an elusive pulsing tattoo which conveyed nothing to me, a European. A priest began to chant and men's voices sang softly in monotones. A vast invisible congregation in twos and threes and little groups gathered together all along the river.

A big star appeared in the sky overhead and the old man leant heavily against my shoulder in a deep sleep. It was time for prayer for at the water's edge gongs and bells summoned the devout to worship.

Someone opened the door of a temple close at hand and reedy pipe music filled the velvety darkness like the perfume of exotic flowers escaping from a hothouse. The pipes grew louder and the gongs broke into a crescendo as if to compete in devout ardour. The sound and soft swish of the flowing river along the bank and the little eddies at the boat landings made a tinkling obligato to the temple music.

The weight of the old man increased on my shoulder.

Presently the cold river air blended with little patches of warmth liberated by the fires and rose up the terraced banks, and I knew that fever mists would follow.

"It is time to go," I said, giving the old man a gentle nudge. He did not answer or move, so I turned gently not to disturb him too suddenly. His eyes were wide open and the smile was still on his face. For a fleeting moment of space which could not be reckoned on a watch, I gazed into his eyes to see perhaps what few "unbelievers" have ever been privileged to see before.

With others I had seen the Taj Mahal by moonlight, the palaces of Maharajahs, the mosque of Jumma Musjid where goldfish with jewelled collars swim in marble canals—the trappings, the splendid façades which we think the East.

Now I looked further and beyond, through the misty purdah, over the holy river, at the heart, no, the soul, of the East. And from below the pipe music came infiltrating with little echoes along the narrow passages between the holy buildings, till it was blown away in the starlit sky above Benares.

ECONOMIC SECTION

British Trade with China

by O. M. Green

IN any attempt to sum up conditions in China today one is confronted, if not wholly baffled, by the violent contrast between the implacable Marxists who apparently control the Chinese Government at present and the screams of Peking radio against "imperialists" and all their works; and the obvious existence of a hard-headed body of men wholly intent on repairing the ruin of war in China (in which they have astonished all observers) and to that end are eager to buy from all the world, imperialist or not, if it is what they want. But this latter phenomenon is the aspect of the new Government which surely must never be lost sight of. No one knows better than Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues that the success of their régime depends upon their improving the lot of the Chinese masses. And for that there appears no doubt that Russia alone cannot satisfy China's needs.

It thus becomes specially interesting to try to examine the state of British trade with China. It is not an easy question, as it falls under three main heads, and in respect of two of them exact figures cannot be obtained. These heads are the total of British trade with China; Hong Kong's trade with China, which includes many articles drawn from or sold to countries other than Great Britain; and the business done by British merchants in Shanghai and Tientsin.

Taking first the totals of British trade with China contained in the Board of Trade reports, these show a steady upward tendency, not only as between 1949 and 1950, but between the first eight and first nine months of this year. British imports from China to the end of last August were valued at £4,778,139, or £1,510,469 more than in the same eight months of 1949. But by the end of September the value of imports had risen to £5,958,151, which is £2,488,741 more than in the first nine months of 1949.

In the matter of British exports to China, the value for the first eight months of 1950, at £1,560,125, had dropped £432,511 compared with the same period in 1949. But by the end of last September our exports to China had risen to £2,279,868, or £260,127 more than in the first three-quarters of 1949. Admittedly, these totals are not a large sum. But when one considers that in 1949 China was still in the throes of civil war (and that large parts of the south

are still distracted by petty warlords and bands of leaderless Nationalist soldiers) the upward trend, especially between the first eight and first nine months of this year is certainly worth notice.

China's staple exports are still much as they were in the past—bristles, hides, egg products, soya beans, the unique and valuable wood oil; she is making great efforts to improve her output of silk and tea, and she is, or could be, the world's largest producer of tungsten. Of what she wants to buy, we get a vivid picture from the detailed figures of Hong Kong's trade with China during the first nine months of 1950. This reached the record total of £92,000,000—£55½ millions in exports to, and £36½ millions in imports from, China. The comparable figures for 1949 were £20 and £27½ millions. The increase is all the more striking since, until the outbreak of war in Korea in June, when America neutralised Formosa, the Nationalist blockade virtually killed all trade with ports from Shanghai downwards. The following table shows the things for which Hong Kong found the biggest demand from China (including Formosa, but for a total on her account of only £3,029,590):—

Textile materials and fabrics	£10,910,005
Chemicals and pharmaceutical products	£5,750,994
Rubber and its manufactures	£4,990,622
Heat, light and power products and lubricants	£4,460,561
Iron and steel	£3,701,684
Dyeing, tanning and colouring substances	£2,815,832
Fertilizers	£2,193,307
Cereal products, chiefly for human consumption ...	£2,142,322

China also bought substantial quantities of sugar and

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TRADE

Total for 1950 £475,000,000

ENQUIRIES

Department of Commerce and Industry,
Fire Brigade Building,
Hong Kong.

Cables: ENTREPOT HONGKONG,

Hong Kong Government Office,
Grand Buildings,
Trafalgar Square,
London, W.C.2.

Cables: HONGAID LONDON. Tel.: WHI. 1648

confectionery; feeding stuffs for animals; animal and vegetable oils, fats and greases; pulp, paper and cardboard manufactures; glass and glass ware; electrical apparatus; vehicles.

The essentially civilian nature of Chinese buying is particularly emphasised in Hong Kong, which is not unjustly angry at the charges made both in England and America that she sells war materials that are used to kill British and Americans in Korea. Actually, of rubber (the only one of such materials listed in Hong Kong's exports) China is buying only about two-thirds every month of what she bought before the war; of tin she produces herself nearly all she needs; of iron and steel her buying is certainly trivial for the purposes of war; and all export of petrol and oil, arms and ammunition was stopped by the Hong Kong Government last May.

As already indicated, British goods are by no means all that Hong Kong (which might be called the universal provider of the Far East) sells. American exports to Hong Kong in the first ten months of 1950, of textiles, chemicals, tobacco and manufactured articles were valued at £32,750,000. The consternation caused in Hong Kong by the total ban on these exports pronounced by Washington early in December may be imagined. Some relaxation of this ban was announced on December 22—material necessary "for the minimum needs of the civilian population" will be allowed under licence; but anything deemed by America to be "war-potential material"—no. How this distinction will work out in practice remains to be seen, but it seems certain that there will be an intensified demand from Great Britain for what previously came from the U.S.A.

In respect of the business done by British merchants in Shanghai and Tientsin one can only deal in generalities. For several months past British exporters in Tientsin have not been doing too badly by acting as agents for the Chinese Government in products which it wished to sell abroad. In Shanghai imports have generally been more important than exports, and last spring, under the combined effects of penal taxation, labour demands and the Nationalist blockade, the British community of Shanghai seemed to be faced with utter ruin.

Since the summer, however, the skies have lifted. The blockade has ceased, labour has become more reasonable, and taxation has materially been lightened, the Chinese



Busy side street in Hong Kong (Courtesy, B.O.A.C.)

Government having been brought to realise, through the protests of leading Chinese business men, that the stringency of its methods was causing wide unemployment and leading to a national economic crisis.

It is at least a promising sign that the Communists were ready to face realities and to modify their methods, and British merchants in Shanghai do not despair that life in China has something still to offer them. Certainly the Government officials have never shown any discrimination between them and their Chinese *confrères*. Indeed, there are reports of a new undertone of friendliness towards Britain in recent months. Too much obviously should not be made of such reports. But at least one may believe that, unless the political situation becomes very much worse in the New Year, British trade with China has good prospects of steady growth.

THE SPICE TRADE

by Howard Fox

IN the latter half of the Middle Ages, pepper, cloves, nutmegs and some other lesser known spices, such as cinnamon and ginger, constituted a great attraction for Europeans to seek the sea route to the legendary Indies. The great demand for these products, coupled with difficult and dangerous transport, were the causes why fabulous prices were paid in Europe, and still more so as cultivation and trade became in turn monopolised by Portugal, England and the Netherlands.

When these monopolies came to an end many of the original areas of cultivation lost their world importance. This process of declining significance was striking in the case of Indonesia. Yet, in 1939, that area still exported more than 80 per cent of the world's production of pepper, 70 per cent of nutmeg and mace and 20 per cent of cinnamon bark. The cultivation of other products, however, made the spice exports of the then Dutch colony shrink to less than one per cent of the total weight of

exports and, in 1939, to about two per cent of the total export value.

Spices form one of the main commodities in the entrepot trade of Singapore as, in addition to Malaya's own production of pepper and nutmegs, large quantities are brought in from Indonesia by the merchants in Singapore who process, grade, and re-pack the produce for export to the world markets.

In normal times, Java is the most important region for vanilla cultivation in the East Indies. The very scanty supplies which now and then enter the market from other islands in the archipelago are inconsequential. Large quantities are consumed domestically and cultivation is more important than the export figures given below would seem to suggest.

Vanilla, the so-called vanilla-bean of commerce, is derived from a climbing orchid. Originating from Mexico and other Central American countries, the plant is there collected as a forest product as well as cultivated. From the Western Hemisphere its growth has spread to other parts to such an extent that Mexico is far from being the main contemporary producer. The French colonies have been particularly attentive to its commercial possibilities.

World production is most unstable, fluctuations of between 30-50 per cent during successive years being not infrequent and the quantities exported from the producing countries average out at some 800 tons. The following is a rough break-down of this figure:—

	Tons
Mexico	150
Guadeloupe and Martinique	20
Madagascar	275
Nossi-Bé	60
Comoro Islands	150
Reunion	80
Mauritius and Seychelles	10
Ceylon	10
Java	10
Tahiti	50

In Java vanilla is only planted in mountainous districts, a height of 1,500 to 2,000 feet above sea level being considered the most advantageous altitude. In the island the plant has little to fear from disease and insects though cultivation requires a rich soil and frequent manuring. Plantations are never extensive (one of 2.5 hectares ranks as large). The plant in Java is mainly grown in private gardens and should therefore be considered a product of horticulture. For growth, shade is essential and after three years a newly planted area can begin to yield a crop; the most important yield comes after five years. After eight years it would be economical to clear the area but because older plants do produce something this is not always done.

The Javanese is accustomed in normal times to sell his crop to a Chinese middle-man before the pods are mature. It also frequently happens that the Chinese buyer carries out the entire process of curing. Extract of vanilla is not manufactured in the Netherlands East Indies.

Whereas in the 19th century vanilla prices were remunerative a definite deterioration has taken place in this respect. The manufacture of synthetic vanilline, the main ingredient of vanilla (three to six per cent of vanilline is contained in the bean), has undoubtedly been the main cause of the decline. At one time it even appeared as though the artificial product might drive the natural off the

market. That this has not happened is due to the fact that natural vanilla is still preferred in many quarters because of its more delicate flavour.

(To be concluded)

Japanese Textile Manufacture

IN 1948, in order to meet the wishes of the members of the Far Eastern Commission, S.C.A.P. allowed representatives of these countries to study those technical or scientific processes of commercial or industrial value, which had originated in Japan before December 31st, 1945. Two places were allocated to the Dutch Government, one being placed at the disposal of Indonesia, particularly for the study of the treatment of ramie, and the other was used to send a representative to investigate the condition of the Japanese textile industry. The reason for this was that even before the war, the Dutch cotton and rayon industry found Japan a formidable rival in the Asiatic and African markets, particularly in Indonesia.

The Report* of the findings of this delegation has recently been published, and in it the author, Dr. W. T. Kroese, describes in great detail the situation of the post-war Japanese cotton industry. It was found that although the total spinning capacity had been drastically reduced, the structure of the industry remained basically unchanged, over 90 per cent of the four million spindles working in 1949 being in the hands of the big concerns, the same group exercising direct control over the weaving capacity of the country. The centralisation of production and collectivism in trade, one of Japan's strong points, appeared to have lost little of its old pre-war power, the decentralisation policy of the Occupation having virtually by-passed it. As to supply, production and distribution, quite new problems presented themselves after the war. By the falling-off in the once important silk exports to the U.S., Japan had to forgo dollar funds, which previously had enabled her to purchase a large portion of the raw cotton she needed from America. At the same time, the Japanese policy of mixing sundry cheap, short-stapled and low-class cottons was also restricted owing to the lack of opportunity for flexible buying in the world market.

In the opinion of the delegation, that Japan should have a chance to export in order to guarantee her population a very modest living is logical, but that she must of necessity seize upon the old tried method (which it appears she prefers) of selling at cut-throat prices, is emphatically denied. They assert that it would be possible for Japan to secure her orders, in the majority of cases, at normally calculated cost-prices, and that the aid afforded Japan should be applied in such a way that it does not lead to a clash in the markets of other textile producing countries. It is suggested that it would be preferable if producers in Europe returned to producing articles of a higher range and value and that as long as both Japan and Western Europe are given the opportunity to a large extent to obtain their raw materials from the same source, then a settlement could be devised whereby the various spheres of influence could be delineated.

M. KERSLAKE

*The Japanese Cotton Industry by DR. W. T. KROESE
(Leiden: H. E. Stenfert Kroese's Uitgeversmij n.v.)

DEVELOPING THE PORT OF COLOMBO

by *Austin de Silva (Colombo)*

THE Government of Ceylon have prepared an elaborate scheme to improve the Port of Colombo. A contract has been signed with the French firm of Compagnie Industrielle de Travaux (Enterprises Schneider) to execute the plan as early as possible. Incidentally, this is the largest contract for a fixed sum, which has been placed up to now by the Ceylon Government for the undertaking of specific constructional work.

Preliminary work on the scheme began on December 1st when the Hon. Sir John Kotelawela, Minister of Transport and Works, laid the first block of the North-East Breakwater Quay.

The present Port of Colombo has not the facilities for coping with the heavy work that is thrust upon it. The first plan of development of the Port was, therefore, drawn up as early as 1902, when 37 alongside berths in a wet dock and in piers were planned. However, these plans did not materialise and it was not until 1926 that the matter was seriously taken in hand. Ten years later these plans were again ready, but the war intervened in 1939 and once again the scheme had to be postponed.

The aims of the present scheme of development are to

reduce the cost of imports, particularly foodstuffs, for the people of the country, to lower the f.o.b. cost of exports for the producers of the country's wealth, and to increase the revenue already derived from the port.

The work envisaged comprise the construction of two berths for cargo ships on the existing North-East Breakwater, an Oil Dock for the discharge of two tankers, and lengthening the existing Guide Pier to accommodate two ships. At the same time, the Delft Pier will be erected to provide accommodation for four ocean-going ships and one or two coasters, while the construction of a quay on the existing South-West Breakwater will give up to five berths for ocean-going ships, either cargo or passenger-cum-cargo.

In the development of the Oil Dock, the North Quay will be 775 feet long and the South Quay 700 feet in length. The Oil Dock, which will be dredged to a depth of 35 feet, will be equipped with a safety floating boom across its entrance which will prevent, in the event of fire, the dangerous spreading of oil or petrol over the rest of the harbour. The Dock will be equipped with pipelines leading to the Oil Depot at Kolonnawa, a suburb of Colombo, where the main stocks of the various oil companies are

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
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stored. The lengthening of the Guide Pier by 200 feet, which is a part of this work, will enable two vessels to berth alongside the pier, instead of one as at present.

The North-East Breakwater Quay will be used primarily for the discharge of railway coal and manure cargoes. The railway will have steam traction for the next 15 to 20 years, and adequate facilities are to be provided for handling railway coal imports which annually amount to 200,000 tons. In view of the large-scale development of the Island's agricultural resources, facilities are to be provided for the handling of cargoes of phosphates and other manures, which amount to about 61,000 tons annually. The conversion of the existing North-East Breakwater into a solid quay, 1,120 feet long, will provide ideal facilities for handling these cargoes. As coal and phosphates can be removed from the harbour premises by rail, it is proposed to lay three lines of railway tracks along this quay. The quay will also be sufficiently wide to permit motor lorries to remove other types of cargo.

The Delft Pier will be used for discharging footstuffs and general cargo, and will be sited where the Delft warehouses now exist. Its eastern face will be 1,325 feet in length in order to provide two berths for large cargo steamers. The depth of the water alongside this face will be 33 feet. The western face of the pier will be 1,153 feet in length and will provide two berths for medium-sized cargo vessels. The depth of the water alongside this face will be 36 feet. The existing Delft warehouses will be

demolished and double-storeyed warehouses will be built opposite these alongside berths. This pier will also be equipped with a multiple-storeyed warehouse specially designed for the handling of bagged grain and other cargo, with special chambers for fumigation purposes. A small alongside berth, 413 feet long, will be provided on the western side of the canal entrance, so that small vessels engaged on the Colombo-Tuticorin service may be berthed there.

The South-West Breakwater Quay, which will be similar in construction to the North-East Breakwater Quay, will be some 2,900 feet long, giving five big ships berths, and will be fully equipped with rail and road facilities.

Accommodation for passengers will also be provided in the transit sheds on the most up-to-date lines, similar to the new berths that are being built in the ports of Marseilles and Los Angeles.

The principal facility that will be provided by the new development scheme is that alongside berths will be provided for ships that call at Colombo, both passenger and cargo, in contrast to the present system whereby ships are anchored in the middle of the harbour and contact with shore is by boats and barges.

It is estimated that it will take from eight to ten years to carry out the whole development plan, and that it will cost the Government of Ceylon Rs. 80,000,000. However, when the scheme is completed Colombo will undoubtedly be one of the most outstanding modern ports in the world.



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THE RACE FOR TIN IN MALAYA

By H. I. S. Kanwar

THE existence of tin deposits in Malaya was known even to Ptolemy, who mentions it in some of his writings, while it is also possible that ever since their contact with Malaya in 2500 B.C., the Chinese were mining tin there. According to historians, the Portuguese and later the Dutch learnt of the presence of this precious metal in Malaya in the 16th and 17th centuries, when both these nations were feverishly competing to expand their respective Empires in Asia. It is also known that the East India Company under the British collected tin ore from Pulau Pinang (now known as Penang) and transported it to China for the purpose of smelting.

Right up to the middle of the 19th century, the Chinese were the chief operators of tin mines and made amazing profits out of the trade. In 1874, there was a turning point in the country's history when the British, seeing that the native Malay States were politically unsettled, took the opportunity of intervening between their factional quarrels. The net result of this policy was that treaties were implemented with the Malay rulers of Selangor, Pahang, Perak and Negri Sembilan. Twenty-two years later, these four states were united under one Federal Government with its capital at Kuala Lumpur. During this period the Chinese miners had their main fields of exploitation in the Kinta Valley situated in the State of Perak. As Perak had come under British influence, the British naturally became interested in tin mining and drew out a systematic plan to oust the Chinese from the industry.

At that time, due to their skill and untiring diligence the Chinese were responsible for over 80 per cent of the total output. They kept up this percentage right up to 1912 or 1913.

It was not until 1882, however, that the first British tin mine was established, and tin mining machines were introduced for the first time. These labour-saving devices meant that the Chinese, who depended on manual labour, were at a disadvantage. It was therefore natural that for the first decade or so of the present century there was great competition between the Chinese and the British for the monopoly of the production of tin. The Chinese lost the race because of two reasons—they worked their mines with manual labour and operated only open-cast mines. On the other hand, the British brought in machinery of the then latest types for working their mines. As far back as 1920, British mines produced 36 per cent of the total output, as against the Chinese 64 per cent, but by 1938 the reverse was the case, for the British accounted for 67 per cent of the total output against the Chinese 33 per cent. However, before figures are given to illustrate the trend of tin production in Malaya, it would perhaps be appropriate to give here a short description of the methods of tin mining employed in that country.

One of the oldest methods is known as "dulang washing." It has been commonly used in areas which are richest in tin, that is, where tin is found on the surface of the earth, in shallow ponds or stream beds. The only

apparatus used is a large, shallow, circular wooden tray which the dulang-worker digs into the stream bed or slime. He lifts it up and shakes it from side to side until the unwanted matter drops off the tray, leaving only the heavy tin ore behind. When he has collected enough for the day, he sells the tin ore to the nearest mine. From two to three per cent of Malayan tin is obtained by this primitive method.

Another single method is open-cast mining, in which the process consists of digging or scraping up tin bearing ground, carrying it up to small troughs of standing water where it is broken up. The broken material is then sent down through channels of running water and the tin ore is trapped in sluices. The whole process has to be carried out by hand and is a favourite method with the Chinese mine owners. Another method employed by them even today is the "gravel pump" method. In this type of mining a pressure pump is utilised to feed monitors which by means of strong jets of water cut away and break up tin bearing ground. The broken earth is washed down a channel into the sump of the gravel pump. From the sump it is then pumped to the surface for concentration into sluices. The tin ore settles down and is later collected.

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The latest method of tin mining employed in Malaya is dredging. The equipment consists of a dredge mounted on a pontoon and floating in an excavation filled with water. When the engine starts operating, an endless chain of steel buckets rotates. As each bucket touches the face or bottom of the mine, it scrapes off tin bearing ground and fills itself in the process. The contents of these buckets are passed into a revolving cylindrical screen, where they are broken up by water under pressure. The tin ore is then recovered by sending the broken earth through a number of sluices.

Although steam power is generally used, electricity has come into vogue during the last fifteen years or so. In 1930 dredges thus employed yielded as much as 25,000 tons of tin. Even today they account for the major portion of the tin output.

The advent of dredges completely changed the possibilities of tin mining. They are very economical in comparison with other methods employed, for they can work ground of poor value which would otherwise yield little or no profit. In 1921 the total number of dredges was a mere three dozen. This number was more than trebled by 1936, and at the present time there are about one hundred and fifty of them. Most of the modern dredges are capable of digging up to 150 feet. This has resulted in profitable exploitation of mines which at first were thought to be exhausted and useless. Consequently many mines have thus been able to yield a profitable output. Some areas have had over three leases of life and it is possible that they may even respond to further excavations by improved modern methods.

It is impossible to tell how much tin there still exists in Malaya. So far only the Western Coastal districts have been explored on a large scale. Adventurous experiments carried out on the Eastern side of the main mountain range have shown promising results, especially in Pahang. The biggest mine is located at a site thirty miles from Kuantan on the East Coast. It has a depth of 1,600 feet, has 200 miles of underground tunnels, and employs over 3,000 people.

The export of tin from Malaya, even as early as 1889 was over 26,000 tons, while by 1904 production had almost been doubled. The latter amount was then more than half of the total world output of tin. However, due to other foreign countries, especially Bolivia and Nigeria, entering the field of tin production and increasing their output, the percentage of Malayan tin went down to just over 36 per cent of the total world output in the year 1929. By 1930 the tin industry in Malaya showed signs of over-production and had it not been for the restriction imposed in 1931 by mutual consent of tin producing countries, the position would have been worse. This caused immense losses to those in the trade, as many mines had virtually to close down, throwing thousands of labourers out of work.

However, due to the fact that control on production was put into operation in 1932, prices commenced to rise again, going up to £228 per ton in 1934. This was possible only on a basis of world-wide co-operation, and on account of various schemes that were put through to keep the price more or less stationary, so that there were no further drops. During the four years 1937 to 1940, the yearly average output of tin in Malaya was over 55,000 tons. In 1937, the price of tin varied from £200 to £300 per ton, and averaged £245. In the following year, the maximum and minimum



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
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prices were £217 and £154 per ton, the annual average working out to about £190.

Since the close of World War II, conditions have been different. The demand for tin is much above that produced. Consequently prices rose steadily from £300 to £550 per ton. At the present moment in July 1950, prices have again shot up due to the Korean War which has caused a tin boom in Malaya. The record price reached was £650 per ton. However it is added that the rise in price has also been due to the fact that both Britain and the U.S.A. have been increasing their stockpiles. Present conditions show that the prices may continue to rise so long as the present international situation exists. It may also be interesting to note that Russia is also increasing her Malayan tin demands and is buying through nominees.

The importance of tin in Malaya's economy is demonstrated by the fact that before World War II 40 per cent of the total world output was produced in Malaya. It has been responsible for over one-third of the total revenue of the Malayan Government, amounting to nearly twenty million Straits Dollars annually. After the fall of Malaya in early 1942, the Japanese worked the tin mines carelessly. Machinery thus became almost useless by 1945. Consequently, on the re-occupation of Malaya, the British faced a very grave problem. It was not easy to get the spare parts required to maintain and run the mines properly and it is estimated that it will still take three to four years to put the industry on a sound footing.

Another difficulty that faced the tin miner was finance. Mining companies had lost heavily during the years of Japanese occupation. To revive production required more capital which was not forthcoming either in sufficient quantities or at the right time. To meet the situation, the Malayan Government advanced loans amounting to £6½ million to the tin industry. The Government also undertook to provide machinery for the Chinese mines on a repayment basis.

Under an immigration scheme, mainly meant for the safeguard of Malay interests, Chinese immigration has been strictly controlled. There has therefore been a marked shortage of labour, firstly because of this restriction, and secondly because labourers have been demanding higher wages and amenities in the face of the higher cost of living. Pre-war labour was much cheaper, whereas today labourers want better wages and rations. This has been considered uneconomical and hence a labour shortage will continue to be a problem for some time. It can only be solved by the introduction of healthy trade unionism, since the prevailing labour laws are out of date and detrimental to labourers, and need a lot of revision. Labour policy is being closely studied by the present Malayan Government and it is hoped that it will pave the way for better understanding between the tin miner and the labourer.

Unlike the rubber industry, the tin industry has only made fair progress since the re-occupation of Malaya. However, despite the various difficulties encountered, production has been on the increase. In 1946, only about 8,500 tons were produced, 27,000 tons in 1947, approximately 44,000 tons in 1948, and 48,000 tons in 1949. This rate of progress is highly commendable. There is, however, still much to be done in the way of increasing tin production to the pre-war annual average of over 65,000 tons.

ECONOMIC NOTES

INDIAN RUBBER INDUSTRY

The present boom in rubber has not been felt by Indian producers, who appear not to have shared in this upward swing of prosperity. Mainly centred in Travancore and Cochin, the plantation industry was given protection by the Government in 1946. The stated aim was to foster and promote the industry's further development.

A price system was established calculated, at that time, to enable ageing plantations to carry out a big programme of amortisation; the best seeds were to be brought in from Malaya. In some quarters it was thought that, as a result, production in India would rise from 17,500 tons a year to between 35,000 tons and 50,000 tons.

Things have not gone according to this plan; production in 1949 did not rise above 15,000 tons. Indeed, ever

since Government control came into being production has declined and so has the area of bearing. The main cause of this has been the low level of the control price, at 1s. 3d. per lb. This was unchanged at the devaluation of sterling. The price of motor tyres in India is, however, still free from control.

Not unnaturally, rubber hoarding has been going on and in order to keep the factories at work in the North the Government imported rubber from Malaya at about 4s. 6d. a lb.

An increase in price even to 3s. would, it is stated, give the Indian planters a great stimulus. There is no labour shortage or unrest; there is a big internal market. It is gratifying to learn, therefore, that the Government has referred the whole question to the Tariff Board pending the report of which the Commerce Department will grant a reasonable rise in price to alleviate the industry's hardships.

AUSTRALIAN WOOL SALES

The first half of the 1950-51 wool selling season has ended in Australia with wool prices at record levels.

A feature of recent sales has been the high prices paid for the lower grades of wool, making them relatively dearer than the super grades. This was particularly noticeable at last Brisbane sales, where buyers from Britain, the U.S.A., Europe and Japan competed keenly for low grade wool. However, the price rise has been shared by all classes of wool.


In Geelong during November, merino fleece sold at the highest rates of the season, 290 pence a pound.

Russian buyers came into prominence at the sales in late October and early November, and helped to lift prices for comebacks and fine crossbreds. The class of wool bought by Russia has altered since pre-war times, when her main imports were coarse wools from nearby Asian countries. Since the war she has been interested in merino and fine crossbred wools from Australia and New Zealand. Japan has also been interested in fine crossbreds.

The average price for the current Australian wool season will not be known until next June, but it is expected to be more than 100 pence a

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pound. Australia's wool cheque for the first three months of the present season was more than £A66,000,000 compared with just under £A30,000,000 for the corresponding period of last year. The total wool cheque for the whole season is expected to be £A500,000,000.

BURMA'S RICE EXPORTS

The U.S. Department of Agriculture reports that out of the total international trade in rice of 9,100 million pounds Burma exported 2,600 million pounds in 1949, thus becoming the largest exporter.

The figure given by the Burma State Agricultural Marketing Board for the export of rice for the period from January 1, 1950, to September 17, 1950, amounted to 954,480 tons, or approximately about 2,138 million pounds. Before the war, Burma used to produce 7,800,000 tons of rice, out of which about 3,000,000 tons was exported. Although ranking fourth after China, India and Japan, because of her comparatively smaller population and larger yield Burma had always been the biggest exporter.

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
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
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ELEMENTS OF AN INDUSTRY

IN daily speech the word "element" is too often used wrongly or carelessly. "The elements" suggest "the weather," and "elementary" something easy or simple. To men of science, however, an element describes any substance which cannot be split up into a simpler one by ordinary chemical methods. A dictionary definition is that an element is "the simplest known constituent of all compound substances". This recognition is based on a theory first propounded by Robert Boyle, a British chemist, in 1661. In all nature there are only ninety-two of these "Elements". From these are

built up every single thing we eat or use or see. The function of the chemical industry is to discover how to separate elements which in nature exist in a combined form, to find out how they can be made to combine into substances useful to man, and then to evolve methods of making them do so "to order" on a commercial scale.

The degree of success which this great industry has attained may be judged from the fact that Imperial Chemical

Industries alone uses 50 or so of the more important of the 92 elements known to science to make no fewer than 12,000 different products.



